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Since the ceasefire of 1991, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front have maintained 
a stalemate in the Western Sahara conflict. This obscure war, which recently surpassed 
forty years of hostilities, is at the center of a complex set of regional and foreign interests 
that encourage its prolongation. New threats in the Sahel, a region riddled with 
international crime, have brought the contest into focus as gravely important to world 
order. The UN and international community recognize the potential of this conflict to 
destabilize North Africa and southern Europe and seek ways forward. While the conflict 
has roots in superpower rivalry and Algerian–Moroccan competition for regional 
hegemony, other forces have contributed to its persistence. This study examines potential 
explanations for the persistence of the conflict, especially inadequate UN organizational 
structures, Moroccan nationalism, and Algerian domestic politics. Other factors that have 
received too little attention include competition for national resources, international 
geopolitics, the weakness of neighboring states, and lobbying by special-interest NGOs. 
Critical issues and potential areas of reform are identified and recommendations made to 
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I. THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: OVERVIEW 
The Western Sahara conflict is one of the least known and the most under-
covered conflicts in the world, approaching its fortieth anniversary with no hope of 
resolution. The United Nations (UN) recognizes the Frente Popular de Liberación de 
Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front) as the governing body over the 
region, which it recognizes as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a 
government currently operating in exile in the Tindouf region of Algeria. The 
POLISARIO Front objective is to obtain independence from Morocco and establish an 
internationally recognized sovereign state. Morocco’s government considers Western 
Sahara a territory and the POLISARIO Front a dangerous separatist group that threatens 
the unity of the kingdom.  
Since 1981, when the UN negotiated a truce to armed conflict between Morocco 
and the POLISARIO Front, affairs between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front have 
remained at a stalemate. A web of international interests have fueled the persistence of 
the status quo and created a humanitarian crisis largely hidden from public scrutiny. This 
hostile impasse has weathered major geopolitical storms that have changed the political 
landscape of the world; it has outlasted the Cold War and survived the turbulence of the 
Arab spring (in this time, it has grown as a security and economic threat to North 
Africa and southern Europe—one that could potentially derail U.S. stability efforts in 
the region). 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research asks, what are the factors or dynamics that have stalled the 
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict? To answer this question, the evolution of the 
conflict, the historical and political perspectives of the major antagonists, and the 
military and diplomatic maneuvers of the Moroccan, Algerian, and self-proclaimed 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic governments are presented, with a detailed 
discussion of the Algerian government’s support and lobbying for Western Sahara 
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separatism. The levels of interest and political will of the United States, the European 
Union, and the African Union are also evaluated. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE  
The Western Sahara conflict has rarely surfaced as a top issue for the United 
Nations, world governments, and the media. But with the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Arab Spring, and now the Islamic State (ISIS), the UN and 
major powers have recognized that continuing unrest in this region could destabilize 
North Africa and southern Europe. The most pressing reasons to resolve the conflict are 
an escalating humanitarian crisis, security concerns, the empowerment of international 
crime, and Islamist threats. 
1. Escalating Humanitarian Crisis 
The Saharawi people of Western Sahara lack self-determination and 
independence, denied due to the occupation of their traditional lands by the Moroccan 
government, despite an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion in favor of 
Saharawi self-determination. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimates that over 50,000 Sahrawi fled the violence caused by Morocco’s 
annexation of Western Sahara, settling in refugee camps in the Tindouf region of 
southern Algeria.1 In the years from 1976 to the Arab Spring in 2011, Morocco was 
accused of severe oppression and mistreatment of the Sahrawi residing in Western 
Sahara, and a condemnation for human-rights violations was issued by the UN Security 
Council.2 As late as 2010, the Voice of America reported “that the council expressed its 
condemnation of the recent deaths and injuries during a raid on a protest camp city 
outside the Western Saharan city of Laayoune.”3 Neither the raids nor the violence 
                                                 
1 “Western Sahara Territory,” UNHCR News, accessed September 2, 2015.,http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49e4861f6.html.  
2 “Political Ambiguity over Western Sahara, Polarizing Ideologies, Plight of Refugees Central to 
Fourth Committee Debate as Petitioners Appeal for End to Conflict,” UN News Center, February 4, 2008, 
accessed September 2, 2015. http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gaspd506.doc.htm.  
3 Ibid. 
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gained the attention of the international community, however, and media coverage was 
minimal.  
Sahrawi living in Algerian refugee camps are also alleged to have suffered 
extreme repression, and even torture; the governments of Algeria and the UN-recognized 
POLISARIO Front (PF) have been accused of human-rights violation. In 2015, the EU 
corruption watchdog OLAF released a scathing report exposing POLISARIO collusion 
with the Algerian government in an elaborate scheme to swindle funds from the EU for 
over a decade.4 The OLAF investigation also exposed the defalcation of millions of 
dollars’ worth of commodities from Canada and the United States that had been 
designated to help the Saharawi people in Tindouf. The whole sordid affair is an example 
of how a sticky conflict, allowed to fester, has invited crime and corruption, making life 
ever more unbearable for the refugees in Tindouf. 
2. Security Concerns 
The 2003 kidnapping of some thirty tourists in the Algerian desert by Salafists for 
the purpose of preaching and combat first highlighted the instability in the Sahara-
Sahelian region of western Africa. This has reached a critical state with the recent unrest 
in Mali, which required international military intervention.  
Between 1974 and 2013, at least 31 non-state groups entered into conflicts 
with Sahara–Saharan states at one time or another. Eighteen coups d’état 
were successful in overthrowing governments in the region, notably in 
Mauritania (1978, 1984, 2005 and 2008), Niger (1974, 1996, 1999 and 
2010), Chad (1975, 1980, 1982 and 1990) and Mali (1968, 1991 and 
2012). The violence was especially long-lasting in Algeria (from 1991 to 
2002 and then more intermittently) and in Chad (1973–1994, 1997–2002 
and 2005–09).5  
The contribution of the Arab Spring has been a rise in religious radicalism and 
political turmoil in Tunisia; in Libya, it has created a catastrophe. Moammar Gadhafi 
                                                 
4 Magnus Norell, “Embezzlement in Sahara,” Huffington Post, February 23,2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/magnus-norell/embezzlement-in-sahara_b_6639248.html.  
5 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ”Security Issues, Movement and 
Networks in the Sahara-Sahel,” in An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel Geography, Economics and Security 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 174–176.  
 4 
spent billions of petro dollars to extend his influence in Africa, creating the Community 
of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in 1998 and covering 80 percent of its budget.6 
Gaddafi integrated 28 African countries within the CEN-SAD and forged ties with many 
rebel groups of the Sahel, from which he recruited 6,000 to 8,000 men to join his brutal 
security force. When Gadhafi’s regime collapsed, the non-Libyan members of the force 
fled with a great number of weapons.7 Stockpiles found their way to separatist and 
terrorist groups in the Sahara, including the POLISARIO Front and AQIM. 
3. Criminal Activities 
The fallout from the degradation of the political establishment on both ends of the 
Sahel cannot be underestimated. Major trafficking operations supply terrorist activities 
and connect them to the world economy. Local Saharan criminal activities and 
international criminal organizations have capitalized on the security vacuum and 
increased their activity. 
4. South American Cocaine Trafficking 
Western Africa has become the most desirable route for South American drug 
cartels to reach the European cocaine market. The overhead costs are higher, and so is 
delivery time; but the rate of loss due to seizure is significantly lower. Narcotics-laden 
vessels anchor in the ports of Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, 
Ghana, Mauritania and Senegal, and their cargo makes its way into Europe through via 
two established routes. The eastern route runs through Niger, Chad, and Libya to the port 
of Benghazi. Smugglers taking the western route stage in Mali and traverse the semi-
governed areas in the southeast of Algeria, through the POLISARIO Front camps in 
Tindouf.8 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 197. 
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Security Issues, Movements and 
Networks, 197. 
8 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Global Security Risks and West Africa 
Development Challenges (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), 44–45.  
 5 
5. Other Criminal Activity 
Besides narcotics, these smuggling routes are used for a variety of commodities 
and contraband, such as weapons, ivory, rhinoceros horn, cigarettes, counterfeit medical 
drugs, precious stones, wood, oil, toxic waste, alcohol, stolen 4×4s and luxury vehicles.  
The POLISARIO Front is the main purveyor of light weapons to and from 
Mauritania. The traffic takes place throughout the Western Sahara in Mali 
and in Algeria. The city of Zouerate in Mauritania is a market well known 
throughout the region for its caches and stocks of arms.9  
Human smuggling and kidnapping have flourished amid western- and North 
African unrest. In the last decade, 85 Westerners and seven Algerian diplomats were 
kidnapped from the Sahara-Sahel and held hostage, some of them perishing in 
captivity.10 Westerners are prized targets. 
6. Islamist Radicalism Threat 
The emergence of Al Qaeda in West Africa occurred in Algeria. The Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) surfaced in 1996 and later became the Al 
Qaeda franchise AQIM.11 Within a brief period of operations, mainly targeting Algerian 
security forces, AQIM increased in power and popularity, eventually expanding its 
network into Europe and targeting civilians. AQIM has been responsible for several high 
profile terrorist and kidnapping cases, such as the 2003 abduction of 32 European tourists 
in Algeria, which yielded a ransom of EUR 5 million,12 and the 2007 bombing of a UN 
building in Algeria, killing 26 civilians and injuring 177.13 
                                                 
9 OECD, Global Security Risks, 48. 
10 OECD, “Security Issues, Movements and Networks,” 192.  
11 OECD, Global Security Risks, 14. 
12 Salima Mellah and Jean Baptiste, “El Para, the Maghreb’s Bin Laden,”Le Monde Diplomatique, 
February 1, 2005, accessed September 5, 2015, https://mondediplo.com/2005/02/04algeria.  
13 Katrin Bennhold, and Craig Smith, “Twin Bombs Kill Dozens in Algiers,” New York Times, 
December11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/. 
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Since 2007, AQIM, which declared its support for ISIS in 2014,14 has attempted 
to “unite the Salafi jihadi movement beyond Algeria in Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia, with the ultimate goal of over-throwing the incumbent regimes and establishing 
an Islamic Caliphate in the Maghreb.”15 Islamist terrorists have forged transnational 
alliances in North Africa, Sahel and West Africa,16 exacerbating the Western Sahara 
conflict and underscoring the urgency and relevance of the problem.    
 The Moroccan government and its international partners have had some success 
in responding to Islamist challenges, but the threat is still growing. New radical groups 
such as Ansar al-Islam Fissahra al Muslima, Bilad al Mulathamin—which proclaimed its 
allegiance to al-Qaeda through AQIM—continue to emerge. North African fighters 
forced out of Iraq and Syria present a danger to the western Mediterranean and Europe. 
The ideologies of the Salafiya al-Jihadiya and as-Sira al Mustaqim movements have 
spread, and the activities of al-Qaeda, which capitalizes on the centuries-old smuggling 
routes of the Sahara-Sahel, have notably increased. Moreover, the geographical proximity 
of Morocco to Europe and West Africa, where a substantial Moroccan diaspora exists 
(wielding considerable political, economic, and cultural influence), means that the risk 
cannot easily be contained. “Morocco's fight against jihadist ideology and violence will 
likely be a prolonged struggle in which the strategic stakes are increasingly global.”17  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The factors underlying the failure of the international community to resolve the 
Western Sahara conflict are many and much discussed. The major points explored in the 
literature are summarized in the following sections. 
                                                 
14 Hamid Yess, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb Backs ISIS.” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle 
East, July 2, 2014.  
15 OECD, Global Security Risks, 15. 
16 Ibid. 
17 J. Peter Pham, “Islamist Extremism’s Rising Challenge to Morocco.” World Defense Review, July 
8, 2008. 
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1. Algerian Hegemony 
Algeria has been a staunch rival of Moroccan over regional hegemony since its 
independence from France. Algeria is extremely leery of Morocco’s perceived ambition 
of expanding its borders into Algerian territory. The Algerian government wants no 
interference with its ambition to control the Western Sahara and desire to exploit the 
region’s natural resources.  
Yahia H. Zoubir, in his article “In Search of Hegemony: The Western Sahara in 
Algerian–Moroccan Relations,” meticulously explains Algeria’s regional interests and 
the reason they clash with Moroccan foreign policy, covering the country’s revolutionary 
history, military capability, and colossal military budget. Analyzing Algeria’s rich oil 
revenues and cash reserves exceeding $200 billion, the author makes a compelling case 
for Algeria’s hegemonic view of the region, based on its large resource endowment.18 
In The Middle East Journal article, “The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and 
Realities,” John Damis argues that the Western Sahara conflict is regional and stems from 
the rivalry between two competitive regimes: a constitutional monarchy with a liberal 
outlook towards the West in Morocco and a repressive military regime in Algeria. The 
conflict over the Western Sahara is a simply a struggle between two ideologies 
competing for influence in North Africa.19 The author demonstrates that the critical 
decisions that led to and maintains the conflict were not made in Paris or Washington, but 
in Rabat, Algeria, and Nouakchott.20 Further, Damis writes that while Algeria does not 
officially claim the territory of the Western Sahara, it is waging a proxy war against 
Morocco by supporting the POLISARIO Front.21 
Barry M. Rubin, in Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East, 
details the distrust Algeria has for the West and its ally Morocco. The author refers to a 
                                                 
18 Yahia H. Zoubir, “In Search of Hegemony: The Western Sahara in Algerian–Moroccan Relations,” 
Journal of Algerian Studies 2 (1997): 43–61. 
19 John Damis, “The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities.” Middle East Journal 37, no. 2 
(1983): 169–70, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326560.  
20 Ibid., 171. 
21 Ibid.. 
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diplomatic cable sent by a former U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Robert Ford, describing 
Algerian leaders in 2008, as “a prickly, paranoid group to work with.”22 Rubin makes a 
convincing argument that Algeria keeps the conflict alive to ensure that the Moroccan 
military and economy remain bogged down and unable to fulfill their ambition of 
expanding eastward into Algerian territory. 
Rubin highlights the economic assets of Western Sahara in terms of natural 
resources, teeming coastal fisheries, and access to the Atlantic Ocean, adding these 
economic incentives to the Algerian government’s motivations and role in the persistence 
of the conflict. 
2. Foreign Interests 
In Western Sahara: War Nationalism And Conflict Irresolution, Stephen Zunes 
lays out the historical and political context, juxtaposing the ICJ dismissal of Morocco’s 
claim to Western Sahara with the UN Security Council’s inability to pressure Morocco to 
withdraw from the occupied territory.23 Zunes writes, 
In word and deed, France and the United States have shared a profound 
and longstanding desire to protect, help, and bolster the Moroccan regime. 
Holding a key geostrategic point at the mouth of the Mediterranean, the 
postcolonial Moroccan state has become, by virtue of historical and 
geographical contingency, pivotal to global stability (i.e., Western 
hegemony).24 
This statement captures the author’s main argument that the West, in particular France 
and the U.S., has implicitly or explicitly supported Morocco’s annexation of the Western 
Sahara. The author details U.S. and French direct military support during the war, and 
their activities in the Security Council during the peace process. He uses the phrase 
“Franco–American consensus”25 to refer to American and French dedication to 
                                                 
22 Barry M. Rubin, Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East (London: Routledge, 
2009). 
23 Stephen Zunes, and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara : War, Nationalism And Conflict Irresolution 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 5. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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preserving and protecting the monarchy, even at the expense of peace and international 
law. The author describes the Western Sahara conflict as a threat to the Moroccan 
monarchy, which the U.S. and France consider a model of modernity and tolerance for 
other Arab and Muslim countries. From a Western perspective, the author describes the 
Moroccan monarchy as a “cornerstone of Middle Eastern, African, Mediterranean, and 
even global stability from the Cold War to the war on terror and [the West] cannot bear 
the loss of Western Sahara.”26 Zunes identifies Morocco’s ability to market its alleged 
threats, from socialism to political Islam, to appeal to U.S. and French foreign policy and 
consolidate support.27 
Zune highlights the American tradition of cooperation with Morocco during the 
Cold War, which provided a space where U.S.–Russian rivalry played out28. He adds that 
in recent years, the strategic importance of Morocco to U.S. diplomatic efforts in Africa 
has increased. Morocco’s location, wedged between Europe and vast political unrest in 
the region, raises its strategic significance even further.  
In his book The Dying Sahara: U.S. Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Jeremy 
Keenan asserts that the George W. Bush administration set its sights on controlling 
African oil after 9/11. He adds that the administration created the United States African 
Command (AFRICOM) under the veil of the global war on terrorism to ensure control 
over the flow of hydrocarbons from sub-Saharan Africa.29 
Keenan describes the massive military cooperation between the U.S. and 
Morocco—a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally—and its 
willingness to participate in a multitude of military campaigns in African and the Middle 
East. AFRICOM has a substantial footprint in Africa and relies on Morocco’s logistical 
support and intelligence cooperation. Morocco hosts AFRICOM’s largest annual joint 
                                                 
26  Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 56.  
27 Ibid., 95. 
28 Ibid., 84. 
29 Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara: U.S. Imperialism and Terror in Africa (London, UK: Pluto 
Press, 2013), 124. 
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military exercise, African Lion, in which dozens of European and African forces 
participate.30 
3. Economic Interests And Natural Resources  
The U.S. finds in Morocco a substantial trading partner and gateway to 
investments in African. Morocco’s economic growth has accelerated in recent years in 
terms of GDP, and U.S. exports to Moroccan markets now exceed one billion dollars 
annually.31U.S. investments in Morocco have nearly doubled since the enforcement of 
the U.S.–Moroccan free-trade agreement (the only American free trade agreement in 
Africa), which provides U.S. investors with unparalleled access to African markets.32 
The Western Sahara conflict threatens U.S. economic interests in Africa, particularly its 
ability to counter Chinese economic expansion in the continent. 
In his book EU Integration with North Africa: Trade Negotiations and 
Democracy Deficits in Morocco, Carl Dawson details the political, economic, and 
strategic importance of Morocco to the EU. He cites its strategic location directly above 
the sub-Saharan region on the western corner of Africa and the Maghreb and across from 
Spanish shores, allowing the passage of one the most important gas and oil pipelines 
feeding Europe.33 
The waters of the Western Sahara are a substantial source of resources vital to the 
economies of Spain and Portugal. In The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural 
Resources in Decolonization, Claes Olsson refers to the EU–Moroccan fishing agreement 
as one of many trade agreements between Europe and the kingdom that undermine the 
possibility of exerting economic pressure on Rabat. The author details the terms of the 
                                                 
30 “3,000 U.S., Allied Troops Launch Crisis Response Drills in Morocco,” Air Force Times, May 19, 
2015.  
31 “Agriculture Boosted Morocco’s Economic Growth Rate in 2013: HCP,” UMCI News, June 4, 
2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1531794940?accountid=12702. 
32 “Morocco’s Emergence as a Gateway to Business in Africa,” Atlantic Council, August 4, 2014, 
accessed September 11, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/moroccos-
emergence.  
33 Carl Dawson, EU Integration with North Africa: Trade Negotiations and Democracy Deficits in 
Morocco (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 5. 
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$185 million deal and asserts its illegality, explaining why critics consider this agreement 
a “backdoor legitimation of Moroccan rule”34 in the Western Sahara.  
European countries continue to be major trading partners with the countries of 
northern and western Africa, particularly Morocco and Algeria. France is Morocco’s 
largest trading partner and controls more than 60 percent of its direct foreign investment. 
Multiple EU countries have relocated their manufacturing platforms to Morocco to 
benefit from Morocco’s skilled and cheap labor. The success of Renault-Nissan’s 
flagship plants in Tangier has encouraged other heavyweights of the manufacturing 
industry, notably FigeacAero, Peugeot-Citroen, Bombardier, and Boeing, to invest in the 
Sharifian kingdom.35  
A significant recent discovery of oil and gas off the Moroccan coast, combined 
with a wealth of shale deposits and wind and solar energy in Western Sahara, has 
introduced a new complication in the Western Sahara conflict. In Morocco proper, the 
oil-shale deposit at Timahdit in the Middle Atlas Mountains contains an estimated 15 
billion barrels, while the deposit at Tarfaya contains an estimated 22 billion barrels.36 
These reserves are dwarfed by the reserves estimated in Western Sahara. The Tindouf 
basin, which stretches across central Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and Western 
Algeria, contains an estimated 1.5 trillion cubic meters of recoverable shale deposits.37 
Reportedly, over 40 companies rushed to acquire licenses to drill in the Western Sahara 
region; others invested in Western Sahara by constructing the largest wind farms and 
                                                 
34 Claes Olsson, ed., “The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in 
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solar plants in Africa.38 This level of investment has the potential to satisfy Morocco’s 
energy needs and allow the export of a substantial amount of hydrocarbon and electricity 
to southern Europe. Despite Algeria and the POLISARIO Front’s unsuccessful attempts 
to deter potential investors from establishing projects in the territory of Western Sahara,39 
American and European investors continue their activities in the Western Sahara, 
complicating the Morocco-POLISARIO Front stalemate. 
4. Failures of the United Nations 
In his book 2005 book, The Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, Erik Jensen 
takes a deep dive into the series of events that led to the conflict in the Western Sahara,  
laying the blame for failure to achieve resolution at the feet of the United Nations.40 He 
focuses on the relatively recent history of the country, starting with the colonization of 
Spain in the late 1800s, and explains the king’s post-independence strategy of 
constructing a “Greater Morocco” identity with roots in pre-colonial history. Jensen 
details the chronology of Moroccan control over the Western Sahara and the creation of 
the SADR. Identifying the complicity of foreign actors in the conflict, Jensen divides 
them into Russian and American camps, emphasizing the role of the Cold War in the 
conflict. The POLISARIO Front, backed by Algeria, Libya and Cuba, sympathized with 
the Soviet Union; Morocco was a staunch anti-communist supporter of the West.  
Jensen examines every stage of UN involvement in POLISARIO–Moroccan 
negotiations and demonstrates repeated failure. He observes that the Security Council 
refused to consider sanctions or any form of pressure to bring the two parties to a 
compromise. He also explains how the ceasefire perpetuated the world’s ignorance of the 
conflict’s importance. Anna Theofilopoulou, who covered Western Sahara and the 
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Maghreb region in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs from 1994 to 2004, states in 
her special report that  
the Security Council, while having expressed support for Baker’s efforts 
in its resolutions, proved unwilling to ask the parties to make the difficult 
decisions required to solve the conflict. When Morocco rejected the peace 
plan, the Council, despite having unanimously supported it, did nothing.41  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Four hypotheses are discussed and evaluated in this thesis. The first is that the 
Western Sahara conflict is a product of Algerian aggression and its suspicion of 
neighboring Morocco. While Algeria is a relatively new country created by the French, 
Morocco is an old country ruled by a longstanding dynasty that promotes the great-
Morocco narrative. By this hypothesis, Algeria’s fear that Morocco aims to expend its 
territory, and Algeria’s own desire to pursue economic interests in Western Sahara, are 
the reason for the persistence of the conflict. 
The second hypothesis examines the role of foreign powers in the conflict. 
Morocco’s alliance with France and the U.S. created a venue for Soviet–American rivalry 
to play out during the Cold War, after which Morocco became a U.S. ally in the war on 
terrorism. The POLISARIO Front connection with AQIM puts it on the opposite side of 
the conflict and fuels continuing hostilities. 
The third hypothesis suggests that the Western Sahara conflict endures as a result 
of the UN’s failure to act. Though the IJC found the Moroccan annexation illegal, and the 
UN has the means necessary to force Morocco to withdraw, the Security Council fails to 
act, or chooses not to. 
The final hypothesis is that the conflict persists because of a combination of 
factors. It is curious, for example, that very little literature exists on the Moroccan 
government’s contribution to the continuance of the conflict. This thesis looks at 
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Moroccan lobbying in the U.S. Congress and the ability of the Moroccan government to 
frame the conflict in a way that aligns with U.S. interests and foreign policy. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The questions raised in this thesis center on the conflict’s contemporary phase, 
starting with the Cold War and explore the hypotheses as applied to three major periods: 
after the Cold War; the war on terrorism; and the Arab spring. Each of these periods 
brought a renewed interest in resolving the Western Sahara conflict and set in motion 
new political initiatives to resolve the dispute. While these developments had the 
potential to end the stalemate and produce an enduring solution, they were all in vain. 
This work analyzes three essential elements in this dynamic: the changing environments 
of the conflict and its implications; the effects of diplomacy; and causes for initiative 
failure.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
Following this introduction and literature review, Chapter II offers a brief outline 
of the conflict, summarizing the timeline of events in the current stalemate. Chapter III 
explores the role of the United Nations and MINURSO, while Chapter IV covers 
Algeria’s domestic and regional politics. Chapter V analyzes the research findings of this 
thesis to understand how shortfalls and failures may be remedied.  
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II. CONFLICT OVERVIEW 
Both sides of the Western Sahara conflict have made a tremendous effort to 
promote their positions in the international political arena. This chapter describes the 
geography of the Western Sahara, the social structure of the Sahrawi people, and the 
historical and political context of the disputed territory.  
A. ORIENTATION 
Western Sahara covers 103,000 square miles—an area as large as the state of 
Colorado. To the west are 690 miles of Atlantic coastline; to the north is Morocco; 
Algeria is east; and Mauritania is south. Morocco controls approximately 80 percent of 
Western Sahara, which it considers its southern provinces. The rest of the territory, which 
is fenced by 1,500 miles of sand dunes and defended by land mines, is under the authority 
of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a separatist group created in 1976 to 
challenge Moroccan claims of sovereignty. The SADR government controls a population 
of roughly 50,000 people scattered in refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. 
The population of Western Sahara does not exceed 500,000. Most live in El-
Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla and most are Sahrawi, an ethnicity similar to the Tarfaya in 
Morocco, northern Mauritania and western Algeria. Almost all Sahrawi tribes speak the 
Hassaniah dialect and practice a predominantly Sunni branch of Maliki-rite Islam. The 
SDAR claims that the Sahrawi are a distinct ethnic group, while Morocco classifies them 
among the many variations of Moroccan identity. 
Aside from income from its alleged criminal activities, the SADR depends 
exclusively on the Algerian government for military, political, and financial aid. The end 
of the Cold War in 1991 dried up financial support from socialist/communist countries, 
and the overturning of the Gadhafi regime during the Arab Spring in 2011 eliminated a 
major supporter and donor. Algerian support has also become tight: plunging oil prices 
have left the Boutaflika regime unable to maintain previous funding levels for pro-SADR 
activities. 
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B. PHASES OF THE CONFLICT 
The root cause of the Western Sahara conflict is a matter of perspective. The 
Moroccan regime sees it as one episode in a long Moroccan history. The separatists cite 
Morocco’s annexation of the Spanish Sahara in 1976 as the flashpoint. This thesis looks 
at both claims, beginning with a broad history of the Moroccan regime, followed by a 
close description of the conflict from 1975 to present. 
1. History Leading up to the Occupation 
To understand the Western Sahara conflict from the Moroccan perspective 
requires analysis of cultural, religious, and political factors in North Africa. Morocco 
reaches back to pre-colonial history in justifying its claim on Western Sahara. It sees 
itself as an old state with an ancient culture and a history distinct from that of its 
neighbors. The monarchy, which has survived the occupation of two European powers, 
views the current cycle in its reign as a period of rising strength, territorial expansion, and 
regional hegemony. Morocco rejects the Western perspective of African history, which 
tends to ignore the pre-colonial past,42 and highlights the unique culture and chronicles of 
its people.  
The Berber tribes of the Moroccan region maintained their identities from the pre-
Roman era well into the 14th century. The three ancient Berber kingdoms of North Africa 
had differing approaches to diplomacy and war, which determined their histories. The 
Massylii kingdom of Carthage in Tunisia and the kingdom of Masaesyli (between Tunisia 
and the Moulouia River—that is, in today’s Algeria), disappeared with the Arab invasion, 
but the Moorish kingdoms in Morocco survived. The tribes of Morocco chose 
strategically not to fight against Islamic campaigns in the middle ages, which allowed 
their culture and identity to ward off Arabic culture for millennia a millennium. The 
Moroccan tribes were also bypassed by the influence of Christian culture; the Rif, 
Middle, and High Atlas mountains provided a natural barrier to Western encroachment 
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from the north. These elements were crucial in the birth of Moroccan Amazigh 
nationalism, which would be exploited by a centuries of domestic dynasties. 
To remain in power, the Amazighs effectively created Berber nationalism, 
supporting dynasties that resisted Arabic cultural hegemony by exploiting selected 
elements of Islam and adopting a variant of Islam that weakened the caliph in the Middle 
East. Thus the political history of Morocco since Islam has been one of tension between 
the Amazigh culture, which used Islam to assert its Berber identity, and an aggressive 
religion that sought to eradicate the pagan symbolism in Berber Islam. The effective 
Amazigh strategy was foundational in establishing a Moroccan state, and while 
eventually Arabs exercised a substantial role in politics, it was not until the 14th century 
that Arabic dynasties seized power from the Berbers.  
Since its emergence from the Sahara in 1640, the Alaoui dynasty has weathered 
cycles of strength and weakness and a territory that expands and contracts. Research has 
shown that the Moroccan political establishment—the “Makhzen,” as it is called—
survived through successive dynasties by using rent, force, religion, and nationalism as 
tools of political control, capitalizing on the opportunities of the day. 
The Makhzen government has always been at the service of the monarch. In 789 
AD, King Idriss II created the Makhzen in response to the Berber assassination of his 
father, Idriss I. Idriss II imported Arab mercenaries from Spain to create a militia that he 
could trust and depend on, organizing it into administrative and security elements. The 
use of the Makhzen and its organization became traditional. Subsequent dynasties 
enlisted the support of foreign militias with no Moroccan ties, and the Makhzen primarily 
employed Muslim and Christian mercenaries from the Iberian Peninsula and sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
The Makhzen maintained a number of garrisons of Spanish fighters in Morocco. 
Christian-mercenary farfanes such as Reverter De La Guardia (d. circa 1142) and his 
sons43 were among the notable Catalonian soldiers at the disposal of the Moroccan 
                                                 
43 Michael Lower, “The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of Thirteenth-Century North Africa,” 
Speculum 89, no. 3 (2014): 601–31, doi: 10.1017/S0038713414000761.  
 18 
sultans as they expanded borders and suppressed internal threats. After the Spanish 
Inquisition in 1478, the Moroccan dynasties focused their efforts on their southern 
territories. To protect Morocco’s main source of income, it was crucial that the Makhzen 
maintain control of trans-Saharan trade routes. Eventually, expansion of the Moroccan 
borders became necessary. With the help of the Christian militia, Morocco decimated the 
Shongai kingdom of Mali in 1590 in the battle of Tondibi44 and extended its territory 
south to the Senegal River. From then to the 18th century, the king of Morocco appointed 
the governor of the Mali delta in Timbuktu— which is the foundation of Morocco’s claim 
of sovereignty over the southern territories. 
In the 15th century, the Spanish kings began to repatriate Christian militias serving 
Muslim rulers, and recruits from the Iberian Peninsula dwindled. Requiring a new source 
of foreign militias, the Sherifian empire turned to Africa. King Moulay Ismael, an Alaoui 
Sherifian sultan, recruited a legion of west Africans,45 organizing them in highly trained 
infantry and cavalry units that allowed him to unify his territory, drive the Spanish out of 
Morocco, recapture Tangier from the British, take back Mauritania, and keep the 
Ottomans at bay. This “Black Guard” still exists today as the official guard of the 
Moroccan monarch. 
Eventually, however, Morocco could no longer depend on mercenaries to 
constitute its army. First, Christians were no longer looking to Morocco for employment. 
Second, the sultan disbanded most of the Black Guard, who attempted to revolt.46 Instead 
of strategically modernizing the military, the sultan relied on a few tribes to provide 
security in exchange for land and a portion of tax revenues. Morocco became a land of 
conflict between the Makhzen tribes (blad el Makhzen) and other tribes (blad siba). By 
the end of the 19th century, the sultan’s control had weakened and the government was 
deeply decayed. Morocco’s huge phase of expansion and reversed to contraction. The 
sultan practiced a strategy of dividing and conquering that allowed the Makhzen to 
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survive; but the disfavored tribes rebelled and attacked European interests in Morocco, 
setting the stage for European colonization in the late 1800s. 
 Citing increasing unrest, the French and Spanish divided the Sherifian Empire 
into three territories in (1912). France promoted colonization to secure its territory, 
Algeria, which it had held for a century. To establish peace in western Algeria, France 
adopted a two-step strategy. First, the Algerian borders were pushed further west and 
south; then unrest was encouraged within Morocco, to the point where the central 
government could not resist France’s promise of protection. France expanded Algeria’s 
borders to include the oasis in the south and Gourara, Tidikelt, Saoura, and Tindouf in the 
west, carved out of Moroccan territory. This appropriation became the source of the 
Moroccan–Algerian War, or the Sand War, in 1963. The Spanish, meanwhile, established 
a colony north and west of the Rif Mountains and a southern territory that later became 
Western Sahara.  
The European occupation of Morocco was brief. The French exiled the king to 
create a new regime, but inadvertently sparked a national unification movement that 
returned King Mohammed V and his family from exile. A two-year revolt culminated in 
the expulsion of the French and Spanish and independence in 1956. Soon, however, the 
tribes of the Rif Mountains, which had led the uprising, contested the rule of the king. In 
response, the king sent military forces and decisively suppressed the opposition. This 
marked the beginning of Morocco’s formal claim of sovereignty over all territories it had 
controlled before the European occupation. The king could not make concessions to the 
Rif tribes for fear of reverberations throughout all the country’s minority groups; he was 
forced therefore to pursue a policy of reigniting the old Moroccan religious and national 
identities that had been used by his predecessors in the Sherifian Empire. The Moroccan 
monarch revived his traditional role as a spiritual, military, popular, and tribal leader and 
successfully consolidated power. His assertion of control over Western Sahara reinforced 
his claims of authority. 
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2. Spanish Decolonization (1956–1976) 
In 1959, France created Mauritania, effectively curbing Moroccan expansion, 
while Spain struggled to maintain direct control of Western Sahara. The United Nations 
General Assembly exacerbated tensions by pressuring Madrid to allow Western Sahara 
the option of self-determination.47  
King Hassan II of Morocco increased the regional and international political 
pressure on Spain in the early 1960s by recognizing Mauritania and reestablishing 
diplomatic relations with Algeria, which agreed to support Moroccan interests in the UN 
Special Committee of 1966, meeting in Addis Abeba.48 In 1967, in an effort to control 
the outcome, Spain proposed a national referendum on self-government; Spain also 
created a legislative body composed of Western Sahara tribal leaders, the Yema’. In 1973, 
Spain offered the Sahrawi tribes a formal opportunity for limited self-government, and 
started the census of the population preparing for a referendum,49 Morocco objected, 
calling for UN mediation50 and International Court of Justice (ICJ) intervention and 
initiating a partition deal with Mauritania.51 On 13 December 1974, the Spanish general 
assembly approved Resolution 3292, requesting ICJ advisory opinions on two questions: 
1. Was Western Sahara a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) at the 
time of Spanish colonization? 
2. What were the legal ties between this territory, the kingdom of Morocco, 
and the Mauritanian entity?52 
In May 1975, the ICJ halted the referendum on self-determination and deployed a 
UN fact-finding team to Western Sahara. After a wide-ranging visit, the team reported 
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that the Sahrawi desired a sovereign state independent of Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania 
alike.53 On 16 October 1975, the ICJ returned a negative verdict on question one: the 
territory of Western Sahara had not been terra nullis. Spain was able to convince the ICJ 
that Madrid had ruled over the Western Sahara through agreements with local tribal 
leaders54 since 1885, and the ICJ dismissed Morocco and Mauritania’s claims of 
authority.55. However, in answer to question two, the ICJ recognized ties of allegiance 
between Saharan nomadic tribes and the Moroccan monarch. The ICJ concluded:  
Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the 
application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
decolonization of Spanish Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of 
self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of 
the peoples of the Territory.56 
Since historical allegiances were the foundation of the monarchy’s claims, Hassan 
II interpreted the ICJ ruling in his favor, concluding that the ICJ provided legal grounds 
to integrate Western Sahara without benefit of a referendum. In 1976, he deployed 
350,000 civilians on the “Green March,” a strategic 30-km, peaceful walk from Tarfaya, 
in southwestern Morocco, to Western Sahara.57 
Saudi Arabia financed the Green March, while France and the U.S. provided 
logistical support and diplomatic cover. The Spanish government, in turmoil at the 
impending death of Franco, was caught off guard. Facing the reality that it would have to 
decolonize eventually, Spain sought to avoid military confrontation and lobbied to save 
face58 by letting the Green March advance into Spanish territory while hoping for a 
resolution in the UN condemning it; but France and the U.S. defended Morocco’s 
position causing Spain to lose the political battle in the UN and liberate Western Sahara.   
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On 6 November 1975, the Green March arrived within yards of the Spanish 
military’s defensive positions.59 Prince Juan Carlos, who was within days of ascending 
the Spanish throne, had no leadership or military experience and wished to avoid 
escalation. Citing political and economic hardships, prime minister Arias Navarro 
recommended an amicable agreement and, outmaneuvered, Juan Carlos ordered his 
troops to retreat. On 14 November 1975, both governments signed the Spanish Accords, 
in which Spain relinquished its sovereignty over Western Sahara in favor of both 
Morocco and Mauritania. The treaty invoked the involvement of the UN, which struggled 
to balance the Western Saharan quest for independence with this transfer of authority. 
The new treaty did not initially gain the support of the Yema’a; 67 of its 102 
members called to dissolve the council and rallied to elect the POLISARIO Front as sole 
representative of the Sahrawi people.60 Eventually, Morocco and Mauritania secured a 
razor-thin majority in the Yema’a. On 26 February 1976, 57 members of the assembly 
voted in favor of the Spanish Accord, ending 91 years of colonial rule.61 King Hassan II 
had succeeded in forcing Spain to hand over Western Sahara without firing a shot. The 
Moroccan government had won—but the conflict was just beginning.   
3. The Ceasefire (1976–1991) 
In 1976, King Hassan II incorporated Western Sahara as Morocco’s southern 
territories and began to consolidate power. To eliminate any potential POLISARIO 
threat, Hassan launched an immediate military offensive against the residual anti-Spanish 
insurgency. The operation was brutal, inflicting serious casualties and forcing thousands 
of Sahrawi refugees into the Tindouf region of neighboring Algeria.62 
The POLISARIO Front proved very resilient and managed to gain the financial 
support of Algeria. More important, it formed a Sahrawi government in exile that secured 
the recognition of the Algerian president, Boumediene. Algerian support became a 
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serious asset for the POLISARIO Front and Sahrawi separatist movement.63 Besides 
financing refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria’s petrodollars provided the POLISARIO 
Front with access to sophisticated weaponry, with which they fended off Moroccan and 
Mauritanian forces for fifteen years. 
The POLISARIO Front employed guerilla tactics, carrying out well-executed 
raids before retreating to camps in Algeria. Morocco was forced to develop a defensive 
strategy in the form of a berm equipped with surveillance instruments and protected by an 
extensive minefield as a buffer zone. By this means, Morocco maintained control of 80 
percent of Western Sahara and negated the POLISARIO’s tactical advantage. 
4. The Present (1992–2016) 
While Algeria offered strong support to the POLISARIO Front and Sahrawi 
separatists,64 Morocco received substantial financial, political, and military support from 
its foreign allies. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. financed the construction of the berm and 
other endeavors that reinforced Morocco’s upper hand.65 In addition to equipment, 
France provided direct military support,66 repeatedly attacking separatist strongholds67 
and providing air cover for a number of Moroccan military operations. 
By 1988, the conflict was at a stalemate. Morocco couldn’t decisively win the war 
without destroying insurgent retreats in Algerian territory, and the POLISARIO’s guerilla 
tactics were useless against the berm. With the global communist threat ending, the time 
was ripe for negotiations. Initially, the Organization of African Unity, an entity largely 
created and financed by the Libyan government, attempted to broker a peace deal on 
many occasions, but in vain—Morocco distrusted the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and Gadhafi, who had supported the POLISARIO from its inception. 
Acknowledging the window of opportunity created by the fall of the USSR, the United 
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Nations intervened;68 Secretary General Pérez de Cellar resuscitated OAU proposals and 
reintroduced the option of a referendum on self-determination. His efforts were well 
received: both parties agreed, and in September 1991, Morocco and the POLISARIO 
announced a ceasefire. But the political war was just beginning. 
The U.N. Security Council proposal was simple. Resolution 690 (1991) tasked the 
United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara69 
(MINURSO) to identify all voters eligible to participate in a referendum on the question 
of integrating Western Sahara into Morocco or becoming an independent state.70  
MINURSO proposed to employ the Spanish census of 1974 to create a voter roll. 
Morocco objected to use of the census, claiming that 130,000 Sahrawi voters had not 
been counted and that a few nomadic tribes had been migrating north into Moroccan 
territory and were not represented. The POLISARIO Front rejected Morocco’s claim, and 
once again negotiations stalled.71 
During the following decade, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front spent 
tremendous political capital to mold an electorate that would decide the future of the 
Western Sahara according to their vision. The rebels threatened violence as the UN 
worked to preserve the brokered ceasefire. In December 1996, the secretary general 
invoked the help of an international political heavyweight, former U.S. secretary of state 
James Baker, to reignite the extinguished negotiations.  
Baker created a lifeline by proposing in the Houston Accords of September 1997 
to recount the voters and implement the previously proposed referendum. Accordingly, 
MINURSO performed a recount, based largely on the 1974 census, and in January 2000, 
provided the UN with a list of 86,386 voters.72 Morocco rejected the list and submitted 
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130,000 appeals73 on behalf of Sahrawi living in Western Sahara but allegedly 
uncounted. Baker’s first attempt had failed. In February 2000, Secretary General Kofi 
Anan called on Baker to explore alternatives74 for what he described as “an early, durable 
and agreed resolution of the dispute.”75The negotiations had hit a snag with the death of 
Hassan II and ascension of Mohamed VI, in 1999; Mohamed rejected any concept of a 
referendum. Nevertheless, Baker came up with the “Framework Agreement on the Status 
of Western Sahara”76 (Baker Plan I), that would grant Western Sahara autonomy under 
Moroccan sovereignty.  
In June 2001, the secretary general submitted Baker Plan I to the UN. It offered 
the POLISARIO the possibility of forming a regional government in Western Sahara 
capable of governing all functions except foreign affairs, defense, and security, which 
would be administered by the Moroccan government. Furthermore, the proposal 
stipulated that the Western Sahara would be governed for five years by a legislative body 
elected by the voters in the MINURSO list; thereafter, the fate of Western Sahara would 
be decided by referendum. Morocco welcomed Baker I. It did not provide an 
independence option and allowed all adult residents77 of Western Sahara to vote, 
including the additional 130,000 additional Sahrawi claimed by Morocco. The 
POLISARIO, which found the plan too favorable to Moroccan interests, rejected Baker 
Plan I.78 
The Security Council was back to square one, but determined to press on. In July 
2002, it instructed Baker to push for further negotiations.79 Driven by Moroccan and 
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POLISARIO motivation to reach a compromise, in May 2003, Baker revealed a second 
plan. Baker Plan II, The “Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western 
Sahara,” proposed a four-year, temporary self-government represented by the Sahrawi 
identified in the MINURSO census. At the end of this period, a final referendum for 
those who had resided in Western Sahara since 30 December 1999 would determine the 
future of the territory. Unlike Baker I, Baker II included a mechanism that curbed 
Morocco’s potential control over Sahrawi self-government; it also allowed the Sahrawi to 
choose independence or full integration into Moroccan territory.80 The plan received 
international approval and in July 2003 seemed to have a real shot at ending the conflict. 
Without exception, every member nation of the UN supported the plan; even Algeria and 
the POLISARIO Front were in favor. In July, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 
1495, and an end to the Western Sahara conflict seemed in sight. Yet in April 2004, 
Morocco refused the proposal and appealed to France and the U.S. for political support in 
the UN. Protecting its interests in Morocco, France came to the rescue and blocked the 
resolution, saving the Moroccan government from potential international sanctions.  
Experts criticized Morocco for walking away from a deal that every nation had 
endorsed.81 They argued that Morocco had learned a cautionary lesson from observing 
East Timor’s self-determination experience, which ended with its secession from 
Indonesia in 1999, and that Morocco had never intended to grant the POLISARIO Front a 
real shot at autonomy. James Baker was at wit’s end, having failed to bring the parties to 
agreement despite ingenious diplomacy. The UN’s inability to sanction Morocco 
exacerbated Baker’s frustration and led to his resignation in July 2004. 
After three years of stalled progress, Morocco proposed a new self-government 
initiative in April 2007 that would enable “the Saharan population to manage its own 
affairs freely, democratically in full respect of the sovereignty of the kingdom of 
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Morocco and its national integrity.”82 This plan was well received by the Bush 
administration; undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns called it “a serious and credible 
plan.” In the Obama administration, secretary of state Hillary Clinton declared it “serious, 
realistic, and credible—a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the 
Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.”83 
The POLISARIO countered with a proposal that included a self-determination 
option. Morocco rejected the offer and fruitless negotiations continued though 200884 
and 2009. In November 2010, Morocco saw what some consider the real beginning of the 
Arab Spring, when pro-separatists in camp Gdam Izik, near El Aiun,85 organized 
demonstrations that aroused a violent response from Moroccan security forces. The 
ensuing clash led to twelve civilian fatalities and dozens of injuries, evoking international 
condemnation,86 but no sanctions against the Moroccan regime. In April 2012, the 
MINURSO proposed enlarging its mandate to include protection for human rights.87 As 
usual, France blocked the motion,88 limiting potential pressure on Morocco. 
The conflict persists today, though the new democratic Moroccan constitution, 
passed in July 2011, includes a system of self-government and decentralization, 
“regionalisation avancée,” for Western Sahara. Meanwhile, Morocco has made a serious 
effort to invest in and develop the disputed territory. On the fortieth anniversary of the 
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Green March, Mohammed IV launched regional projects worth $1.8 billion dollars,89 
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III. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE UN  
The third hypothesis suggests that the Western Sahara conflict continues because 
of the UN’s failure to act. Though the IJC found the Moroccan annexation illegal and the 
UN can force Morocco to withdraw from Western Sahara, the United Nations Security 
Council has failed to act.  
The United Nations’ mandate is to promote peace, security, human rights, and 
economic and social development.90 With 193 member states, the UN acts mainly 
through the general assembly (UNGA), security council (UNSC), and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). Under the UN charter, the UNSC is responsible for matters of 
peace and security, and its decisions are consequential. Unyielding governments usually 
face international sanctions or military action.  
The integrity of the UN is vital to world peace and stability. The UN should be an 
honest broker and impartial intermediary, never using its mechanisms to benefit powerful 
member states. In today’s hyper-connected world a functional cooperative body is needed 
to help secure a prosperous future for all. 
A great deal has been written on the role of the UN and international community 
in the Western Sahara conflict. Some denounce France and the U.S. for their influence in 
favor of Morocco, pointing to the money Morocco spends on high-powered Washington 
lobbyists.91 Others criticize Morocco for obstructing MINURSO, accusing the Sharifian 
government of having played waiting games “until the UN ran out of patience or money 
or both.”92 This chapter examines whether the UN, through the UNSC, has fulfilled its 
mandate in dealing with the dispute. 
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A. SPAIN AND INSURGENCY 
The UN championed the mid-1900s wave of decolonization in third-world former 
colonies, issuing the United Nations Colony Declaration in 1955.93 As expected, the 
occupying states resisted this initiative. In North Africa, Spain occupied several strips of 
land that were important to its economic and strategic interests. UN diplomatic pressure 
was relentless, however, ultimately causing Spain to liberate Western Sahara.94  
During this period, anti-Spanish organizations, inspired by leftist and pan-Arab95 
ideologies, bloomed in the region, notably, the Saharan Liberation Organization (MLS-
Harakat Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab). However, brutal suppression by the 
Spanish in 1973 pushed the MLS to morph into a violent insurgency known as the 
POLISARIO Front (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de 
Oro).96 This armed guerrilla group targeted Spanish economic interests and infrastructure 
in Western Sahara, perpetrating violence, kidnappings, and executions that aroused 
international attention. 
In 1975, the UN launched an investigation of the unrest97 and, after receiving a 
lengthy report, recognized the POLISARIO Front’s struggle for liberation while stopping 
short of further action on behalf of the Sahrawi people. It was not until 1961 that a UN 
decolonization committee was able to place Western Sahara on the UN agenda, and the 
UN did not issue a resolution urging Spain to decolonize until 1964. Morocco supported 
this resolution and stood for the Sahrawi’s right of self-determination—ironically, in light 
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of subsequent events. In December 1966, the UN passed Resolution 2229 (XXI),98 
forcing calling upon Spain to conclude its occupation of Ifni and Western Sahara.  
Spain resisted UN pressure and explored means to maintain control. In 1966, the 
UN received 800 declarations from Western Sahara tribal leaders employed by the 
Spanish, claiming that the people wished to remain under Spanish rule.99 Aware of 
Spain’s antics, the UN did not object to Spain’s involvement in political affairs of the 
Western Sahara so long as a plan for a referendum was in the works. The Spanish 
government allowed the Sahrawi congress, Jema’a, to establish a legislative body and 
then, to further its agenda, sponsored another political party, the Saharan National Unity 
Party (PUNS).100 Finally, in 1975, Spain concluded a census of Western Sahara and 
announced it would hold a referendum.  
Fearing a negative outcome, Hassan II of Morocco sabotaged the Spanish plan by 
invoking ICJ intervention, which required the UN to suspend the process.101 Resolution 
3292 (XXIX)102 was issued, blocking the referendum pending the high court’s decision, 
and a UN investigative diplomatic delegation was sent to Western Sahara, Madrid, Rabat, 
and Nouakchott.103 This expedition proved a turning point for the Spanish in Western 
Sahara.   
In preparation for the UN delegation, the Western Sahara governor, General 
Gomez de Salazar, directed his security forces to prevent any sabotage by insurgents. The 
security forces banned all known anti-colonial activists from traveling to potential 
diplomatic destinations. Gomez assembled huge crowds to welcome the diplomats at the 
airport and placed them along the road to Laayoune city center to wave Spanish flags and 
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pro-POLISARIO banners. However, this propaganda stunt backfired. Instead of waving 
pro-Spanish colors, the crowed hailed the convoy in a riot of POLISARIO colors.104 The 
tremendous turnouts at every site shocked the Spanish governor and embarrassed Madrid. 
This expression of anti-Spanish sentiment infuriated the homeland Spanish constituency, 
increasing pressure on the already fragile government of the ailing General Franco.  
POLISARIO National Union Party (PUNS) leaders were as stunned as their 
Spanish sponsors. Once it became clear that Spain had lost control, the PUNS jumped 
ship; the most influential man in the party, Khalihenna Ould Rashid, and his allies turned 
on Spain, declaring allegiance to the king of Morocco.105 Amid the confusion, the UN 
commission continued its visit in accordance to plan. Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott 
echoed their unified support for Sahrawi rights of self-determination. The final report 
presented by the UN diplomats concluded that  
the co-operation with Spanish authorities allowed the Commission to visit 
every major center in spite of the very limited timeframe at its disposal 
and collect information on the position of local population. Everywhere 
the Commission went was met with political mass demonstrations. The 
Commission had meetings with the representatives of all of the 
communities of the Sahara. All this made the Commission clearly 
understand that there is a major agreement among the people of the Sahara 
on the issue of independence.106 
Spain’s diplomatic failure improved Morocco’s position. The UN recognized the 
Sahara Arabic Democratic Republic (SADR) and, mindful of Morocco’s manipulations, 
began to supervise a transfer of power.  
B. MOROCCAN OBSTRUCTIONISM  
Morocco has always meddled in the affairs of Western Sahara, and with these 
new developments, pursued a dynamic waiting game, adjusting its strategy and tools of 
obstruction brilliantly in response to new developments. In The Western Sahara, Janos 
Besenyo discusses some of Morocco’s covert operations. 
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1. Sponsorship of a Militia 
Besenyo reports that the Moroccan government orchestrated, financed, and 
directed several anti-Spanish insurgencies before the UN visit to Western Sahara in 1975. 
He presents evidence implicating Morocco in the creation of the Movement for Free 
Unification (Frente de Liberacion y de la Unidad-FLU), which wreaked havoc on 
Spanish targets, Sahrawi civilians, and POLISARIO strongholds.107 
2. ICJ Intervention  
Morocco’s “obstruction while waiting” can also be observed in the ICJ 
intervention. Besenyo explains that the insurgency forced Spain to increase its military 
footprint, which sparked Morocco to mobilize 25,000 troops to its border in response. 
The UN feared an escalation to war, but hoped that Spanish negotiations with the 
POLISARIO, PUNS, and Jema’a would deliver a peaceful transfer of power.108 
Unbeknown to Spain, Morocco had already struck a secret land-division deal with 
Mauritania. When Spain and the POLISARIO agreed to a referendum, Hassan II invoked 
ICJ intervention, forcing the election’s postponement.109 
3. The Green March 
Morocco stunned the international community with the Green March,110 but the 
world was more surprised by the UN’s response than by the march itself. Though the UN 
had previously recognized Sahrawi efforts towards liberation, it stopped short of issuing a 
statement, asking all parties “to avoid any unilateral step or any other action which would 
aggravate the situation.”111 Morocco had capitalized on Spain’s weak foreign policy 
through the Green March, which forced Franco’s government to negotiate. On 11 
November, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accord. The PUNS was 
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compelled to sign the treaty because it was the only party representing the Sahrawi that is 
recognized by the UN and the international community. The UN, which had insisted in its 
resolution that “the views of the Saharan population, expressed through Jema’, will be 
respected,” had to ratify the treaty.112 The POLISARIO Front, however, rejected the 
accord, forcing the dissolution of the PUNS two weeks later. Perplexed, the UN passed 
two conflicting resolutions: in Resolution 3458/A, it reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi 
to freedom and self-determination; in Resolution 3458/B, it endorsed the Madrid Accord, 
calling on all signatories, including the PUNS, to respect the terms of the treaty.113 While 
the UN was sifting through what had happened in Western Sahara, Morocco extended its 
forces over the entire territory. 
4. Security Reinforcements 
In March 1976, The UN appointed a delegation to gather a first-hand account of 
the newly liberated territory and the camps in Tindouf. The decision was ill received by 
both Rabat and Nouakchott; they considered the UN’s finding provocative and denied 
entry to the diplomats. Consequently, the POLISARIO resumed its violence, targeting 
Moroccan and Mauritanian assets. The assaults advanced into the Mauritanian capital and 
extended within Morocco in TanTan, Jdiria, and Guelta-Zemmour.114 
The Moroccan military met the confrontation with brutal force, fending off the 
POLISARIO raids. Mauritania, by contrast, was ill prepared to take the offensive. Under 
siege, the Mauritanian president vainly requested UN intervention. France, with which it 
had the strongest ties, refused involvement; but as the POLISARIO targeted French 
companies in Mauritania and killed and kidnapped French citizens, France was inevitably 
drawn into the conflict.115  
Domestic pressures forced French president Giscard d’Estaing to take action. 
Without a UN resolution, France organized a military campaign to prevent any future 
                                                 
112 Hodges, Western Sahara, 235–237. 
113 Christopher O. Quaye, Liberation Struggles in International Law (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991), 177. 
114 Hodges, Western Sahara, 244. 
115 Ibid., 243–244. 
 35 
POLISARIO threat to French assets and citizens in Mauritania, forcing the POLISARIO 
to release the hostages and cease targeting French interests. The POLISARIO Front was 
forced to reevaluate its tactics.  
Learning from its battles, the POLISARIO refocused its strategy to avoid clashing 
with the French military. The rebels waged a sophisticated campaign against Nouakchott 
that drained its economy, forcing Mauritania to retreat from its newly acquired territories. 
On 5 August 1979, Mauritania and the POLISARIO concluded a peace treaty sponsored 
by Algeria, in which Mauritania recognized the POLISARIO and agreed to relinquish 
territorial claims to Western Sahara.116 Within 72 hours, however, Morocco heavily 
reinforced its troops in Dakhla, recapturing the abandoned territory.117 
In Morocco, the POLISARIO relied on Algeria to carry out its heavy campaigns. 
Successful operations such as the Boumedienne offensive in January 1979 inflicted heavy 
losses in lives and valuable equipment, including four helicopters and F5 fighter jet.118 
It was not until the New York Times and Washington Post exposed Morocco’s use 
of U.S. equipment against civilian populations that Americans and the world paid 
attention. Facing domestic criticism, the U.S. Congress froze military aid to the Sharifian 
kingdom. This seemed to have little effect on Morocco’s vigor, however, as Hassan 
quickly found a new weapons supplier in the apartheid regime of the South African 
Republic.119 
Later in 1979, the UN recognized the POLISARIO and urged Morocco to 
withdraw its military.120 Instead the Moroccan regime increased belligerence, launching 
several ferocious offensives—notably, Task Force Ohud. In November 1979, General 
Dlimi deployed 7,000 troops under flocks of F5s and Mirages and the best of Morocco’s 
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anti-insurgent units, which he had created specifically for the conflict. These indigenous 
units were very effective—they had a stake in the conflict as descendants of tribes that 
traditionally rivaled those tribes supporting the POLISARIO.121 
The Moroccan regime intensified its diplomatic efforts and in 1980, Hassan II 
secured the support of the UN’s most influential states, while recognition of the SADR 
persisted mainly in third-world countries. Domestically, Hassan’s power consolidation 
began. He erected governmental institutions, launched population-resettlement projects, 
and subsidized food and services, minimizing security concerns by constructing a berm, 
bristling with barbed wire, ditches, and land mines, from Guerguerat to Nouadhibou in 
Mauritania.122 
5. Questions of Voter Eligibility 
The berm was a good investment, allowing Morocco to secure an effective 
defensive position and ride out the stalemate. Nearly a decade later, the UN renewed 
negotiations. In early 1989, Morocco’s decision to negotiate a settlement with the 
POLISARIO encouraged the international community. The UN approved two 
resolutions, 158/90 and 160/90 to broker the ceasefire and launch MINURSO 123  
The mandate of the MINURSO was to conduct a referendum based on the 1974 
Spanish census. However, Morocco maintained that Spain had missed some Sahrawi—
that 130,000 nomads were not represented, and that Bedouins related to the Sahrawi in 
Tindouf, should have a voice in deciding the fate of their land.124 MINURSO 
representative Johannes Manz rejected this claim, but secretary general Javier Perez 
Decullar supported Morocco’s position, causing the UN special representative to 
resign.125 With Manz out, Morocco’s support increased and at the end of Javier 
Decullar’a tenure gained a tremendous edge in the person of his replacement, Boutros 
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Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian friend of the Moroccan regime. Under Boutros-Ghali’s 
influence, the UN decided to consider the Moroccan position, postponing the 
preparations for a referendum in 1992. The POLISARIO denounced the decision, 
threatening a return to war. In August 1994, the MINURSO was compelled to resume 
voter registration, only to suspend it two months later. Morocco obstructed the process by 
restricting access to the Sahrawi population126 and accusing the POLISARIO of 
including sub-Saharan mercenaries in the census. The referendum effort was delayed 
until September 1997, when the UN reengaged both parties in Houston, Texas.127 
6. Claims of Sovereignty 
The Houston Agreement reaffirmed the UN’s 1991 peace plan. This time, the UN 
enlisted former U.S. secretary of state James Baker as special envoy. Initially, his efforts 
were successful; he was able to bring delegations from both parties to Portugal to 
negotiate directly and MINURSO’s mission resumed in 1998. However, the Moroccan 
authorities demanded that the UN consider four matters: 
1. In 1884, after the town of Dakhla was taken by the Spanish, several 
hundred locals from the tribe of Oulad Slim fled to Moroccan territories. 
2. When in 1919 the town of Tarfaya was occupied by Spanish troops led by 
Colonel Penez, most of the inhabitants of the region fled to Morocco.  
3. In 1934, when the Spanish established their first garrison in Layoune, 
several Saharawi moved to areas under Moroccan rule.  
4. As a result of Operation Ecouvillon, conducted by the French army in 
1958, many Saharawi fought among Moroccan insurgents while their 
families lived in Moroccan territory.128 
Morocco failed to make a decisive case to the UN, which rejected its claims; but 
meanwhile negotiations had been suspended so that the issues might be addressed, an 
outcome favorable to Morocco’s interests. This cycle was repeated a dozen times. 
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Finally, James Baker proposed a plan whereby Morocco would offer increased 
autonomy and after five years conduct a referendum.129 The plan proposed the 
participation of everyone who had lived in the area within the past thirty years. The 
Moroccans favored the plan, but not the POLISARIO. Negotiations stalled with the death 
of Hassan II in July 1999. As his successor, Mohammed VI, consolidated power through 
popular democratic measures, his domestic support strengthened—along with his 
bargaining position in the conflict.130 
In 2003, James Baker presented Baker Plan II, which the UNSC approved. 
However, the U.S. threatened to use its veto power to block the measure.131 Since then, 
the impotent MINURSO mandate has been extended every year. The new Moroccan 
monarch’s stance has hardened, and now Morocco will not negotiate on two issues: 
unification and sovereignty. It has insisted on either autonomy under the Moroccan 
crown or nothing.132 
MINURSO remains one of the few UN peacekeeping missions operating without 
a human-rights mandate. In a letter to the UN Human Rights Watch, Middle East and 
North Africa Division, MINURSO members called on the UNSC to uphold a “sustained, 
independent, and impartial monitoring” role for the organization, underscoring the failure 
of current mechanisms to meet an impartial standard and calling for expansion of its 
mandate to include monitoring of human-rights and abuses by all parties. 
Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to promote human-rights 
protections. As recently as 2013, the U.S. drafted a proposal to the UNSC that 
incorporated such an element, but when Morocco objected on the grounds that the 
initiative would undermine its sovereignty, the U.S. backtracked.  
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C. U.S. AND FRENCH FAVORITISM  
France and America have supported Morocco’s position since the beginning of 
the Western Sahara conflict. U.S. support to Morocco solidified during the Green March, 
while France’s position has evolved over the years. Neutral at first, the French stood with 
Algeria in support of the POLISARIO before becoming stanch Moroccan supporters.133     
France and the U.S. both facilitated the Green March, France providing the bulk 
of the logistical expertise and the U.S. supplying C130s to transport civilian participants 
from Morocco.134  Since then, France has been a major arms supplier, second only to the 
United States, which increased its foreign military sales (FMS) to Morocco from $8.2 
million in 1974 to $242 in 1976.135 Between 2009 and 2014, Morocco secured $108 
million in military aid,136 becoming the second-largest beneficiary in the African 
continent, after Egypt.137 The U.S. turns a blind eye to Morocco’s illegal weapons use—
though the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and a 1960 U.S.–Moroccan military agreement 
forbid the use of U.S. weapons beyond Morocco’s recognized borders,138 Morocco 
employs these sophisticated weapons in Western Sahara. 
The most critical support that Morocco draws is French and American diplomatic 
cover in the UN;139 these nations have prevented the UNSC from imposing any sanctions 
against Morocco.140 In 2009, 2010, and 2014, France blocked proposed resolutions 
giving MINURSO a human-rights component, defending its position by claiming 
Algerian manipulation and uses of the issue to undermine Morocco.  
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The U.S. also uses its influence in favor of Morocco.141 In 2013, Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon urged the Security Council to implement a “sustained” and 
independent mechanism to monitor human rights in the Western Sahara, which prompted 
the U.S. to propose an update of the MINURSO mandate accordingly. As soon as it 
learned of the motion, however, Rabat canceled planned U.S.–Moroccan military 
exercises, thus suspending its security cooperation. In consequence, the U.S. backtracked 
and dismissed the drafted resolution. 
French and American diplomatic support extends beyond the UN. In the Obama 
administration, a majority of the House of Representatives signed letters calling on the 
president to endorse Morocco's proposal of Western Sahara autonomy under Moroccan 
auspices. This congressional involvement suggests the extent of Moroccan lobbying in 
Washington.142  
Support for Morocco in the U.S. and France is anticipated to grow in light of 
recent events in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan intelligence supplied the tip-off that 
led to the apartment in Saint Denis where the French police captured Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud, the jihadist behind the 13 November attacks in Paris.143 This cooperation 
demonstrated the value of alliance with Morocco and elevated Morocco’s bargaining 
power in the Western Sahara conflict. 
D. INEFFECTUAL PEACEKEEPING  
The demand for state building and peacekeeping operations has increased in the 
face of the current fluid threat. The ever-expending mandates of the UN PKOs missions 
combined with the nature of the new post-9/11 threats make it necessary for the PKOs to 
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provide military contingencies to fulfill immediate security gaps. The link between the 
threats in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, the Sahel, and even sub-Saharan region makes it 
imperative for UN to review its policy on collecting, analyzing and exploiting 
intelligence.   
The persistence of decades-long conflicts such as that in the Western Sahara; 
where the peacekeeping mission MINURSO continues, suggests that the UN PKOs 
model is inadequate requiring a fundamental revision. A hypothesis suggests that the 
Western Sahara conflict continues as a result of the UN’s deficient manning process 
filling, military and civilian, authorizations of the UN’s peacekeeping operations (PKO) 
especially in the case of MINUTSO. Others believe that the PKOs lack the capabilities, 
mainly the intelligence element, to perform their essential military engagements. 
E. STRUCTURAL FLAWS IN THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
UN inspectors have raised concerns about contingency-staff quality and personnel 
shortages in MINURSO. Their reports highlight the PKO’s inefficiency, confining 
policy, and outdated operations.   
1. Staffing   
In the Yearbook of the United Nations 2001, the special committee on 
peacekeeping operations discusses MINURSO’s staffing challenges, reporting an 
unchanged military manning requirement despite the expansion of the PKO mandate. The 
report additionally shows that MINURSO operates with a chronic shortage of 
personnel—the commission was alarmed to find, for example, that at one point in 2001, 
the police force responsible for ten sites in Western Sahara shrank from 47 to 26, which 
prevented it from performing basic functions in protecting UN assets and personnel.144  
The UN special committee also criticized the quality of the civilian staff assigned 
to the PKO mission. In its review of policies and procedures, including those pertaining 
to MINURSO, the report states that  
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the roster for civilian peacekeepers was ineffective and inadequately 
supported, advertising of vacancies was limited, the grading system for 
nearly recruited staff was inflexible, the interview process was inadequate, 
and missions seldom participated in the selection process for international 
staff.145  
 Selection of the military contingents assigned to PKOs is also problematic. 
MINURSO started in 1992, when UN PKOs transitioned from first-generation missions 
model that is composed of national-balanced, small-military contingents to the new 
concept of second-generation missions, which combine civilians with a larger, more 
robust military force. The selection of these military units is based largely on strength, 
efficiency, and interoperability, rather than political affiliation.146 These practical 
requirements, combined with a UN-mandated official language (usually French or 
English), favor Western or Western-trained forces.147 The usual result is a peacekeeping 
element that lacks cultural and political understanding of the conflict—besides which, 
Western-oriented decision makers in a PKO contingency might find it hard to maintain 
objectivity. In North Africa and the Sahel, where the French and American have a large 
military footprint, MINURSO would require French- or American-trained senior decision 
makers for PKO high office. Since these government officials would presumably be pro-
Moroccan, and moreover, since the French military has carried out many campaigns 
against the POLISARIO, French or French-trained officers would likely perceive the 
insurgents as antagonists—or at minimum, display a pro-Moroccan posture.  
2. Disorganization and Lack of Oversight 
In a report published by the Heritage Foundation, Brett D. Schaefer concludes that 
“the UN and its affiliated organizations are plagued by outdated and redundant missions 
and mandates, poor management, ineffectual oversight, and a general lack of 
accountability.” The report blames influential state members of the UN for this 
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inefficiency and slow response, citing, for example, the glacial response to the Western 
Sahara conflict, in which it was three years from ceasefire to MINURSO deployment.  
Since its inception 70 years ago, UN operations have changed very little. In 
What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, Thomas G. Weiss argues that 
whenever major state members express concern over UN decadence and propose a 
reform, the other states block it, because waste and lack of oversight are lucrative for the 
poor states.148 Profiting from rubber-stamp approvals, MINURSO’s mission has not been 
reevaluated in 40 years, despite a yearly budget of nearly $60 million dollars. 
3. Limited Capabilities 
In 2014, the Clingendael Strategic Monitor project published an alarming report 
warning of an increase in the already unprecedented number of world peacekeeping 
organizations, with  ten added in the past decade. This proliferation is not limited to UN 
PKOs—it includes EU, NATO, and the OSCE PKOs as well.149  
The demand for state building and peacekeeping has increased under the current 
fluid threat of terrorism. The ever-expanding mandates of UN PKO missions, combined 
with the nature of post-9/11 attacks, make it necessary to provide military contingencies 
to fill critical security gaps. As links between threats are discovered, whether in 
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, the Sahel, or the sub-Saharan region, it becomes imperative for 
the UN to review its policies on collecting, analyzing, and exploiting intelligence.   
In his book, Policing the New World Disorder, Robert B Oakley writes: 
Intelligence and public information/psychological operations assets as 
well as communications and logistics capabilities of the military 
contingent are vital for restoring the role of law and should be closely 
coordinated from the outset with corresponding CIVPOL functions.150 
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The UN frowns on intelligence collection as bordering on espionage and therefore 
incompatible with UN neutrality. UN organizations are supposed to operate respectfully 
within a host nation, though this position of trust may be exploited by bad actors, groups, 
and governments. But this delicacy comes at a price. In Western Sahara, a hotbed of 
crime, MINURSO operates ten sites. It is fair to assume that in the course of its 40-year 
deployment in Western Sahara and southern Algeria, UN observers, whether civilian or 
military, must occasionally have come across information that exposed illegal activities. 
But crime continues unremarked and unchecked, fueling unrest on a local and strategic 
level. 
MINURSO’s structure, per the UN SOP, maintains the position of a deputy chief 
operations officer (DCOO), whose sole function is to consolidate intelligence collected 
from all the sites and transmits it to the operations center in New York. The UN 
headquarters does not possess an intelligence center that analyzes and exploits this data to 
advance the PKO missions. Instead, the intelligence is carefully shared with a few 
concerned nations. The UN does not share collected intelligence with French and 
American forces operating in the region apart from the UN. These forces rely on their 
own intelligence capabilities, despite the UN–U.S.–French common goal of peacekeeping 
and stability in the region. 
In 2014, during my assignment in support of the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the 
peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, I observed firsthand the impact of 
dysfunctional manning policies and lack of intelligence capabilities on the overall 
mission. The bureaucracy, confining policy, poor management, and outdated operations 
hampered my ability to positively contribute to the spirit of the UN PKO.  
During my tenure, I witnessed the difficulties the UN had in finding, placing, and 
retaining civilian personnel. After arrival, some of these employees could not tolerate the 
uncivilized environment and bolted within a few days. On the military side, I observed a 
huge gap among units in terms of work ethic and experience, which was explicitly 
responsible for the compilations in our daily missions. 
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In addition to MINUSCA’s military presence, other entities operated in several 
portions of the C.A.R defending separate interests, notably AU and EU forces. In the 
chaos of the civil war in the Central African Republic, violence occurred on a daily basis. 
Different forces and opposing factions clashed on a daily basis as well. In this violent 











IV. ALGERIA AND THE POLISARIO FRONT 
Had I discovered the Algerian nation [nation] I would be a nationalist and 
I would not blush as though I had committed a crime . . . I will not die for 
the Algerian nation [patrie] because that nation does not exist. I have not 
found it. I have examined history, I questioned the living and the dead, I 
visited cemeteries: no one spoke to me about it151 
—Ferhat Abbas, “La France C’est Moi,” L’Entente, 23 February 1936 
Algeria’s relationship with Morocco remains contentious despite substantial 
common culture and history it shares with its neighbor. The Algerian government has 
stated publically its support for the POLISARIO Front. As Zune explains in Western 
Sahara: War Nationalism And Conflict Irresolution, “The war in Western Sahara also 
provided it (Algeria) with a golden opportunity to pursue its strategic interests indirectly. 
As one Algerian official boasted in early 1976, ‘We’re going to bleed Hassan 
white’(quoted in Parker 1987, 113).”152 Algeria meanwhile struggles to carve a national 
identity apart from Morocco’s dominance. Algeria’s internal conflicts as to the nature of 
its personality, combined with an internecine struggle for power and political aspirations, 
exacerbate its crisis.   
Domestically, the political jostling within the Algerian regime plays a powerful 
role in foreign policy and interactions with regional and international players. As a major 
stakeholder, Algeria profoundly influences the regional dynamics that fuel the Western 
Sahara conflict, and any proposed resolution that envisions a resolution located solely 
within Western Saharan borders is myopic.  
An approach that centers on problems like a cease-fire and referendum 
that are limited to the Western Sahara itself is unlikely to succeed. These 
problems, though important and immediate in their own right, need to be 
linked to broader regional issues-the ratification by Morocco of the 1972 
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border agreement with Algeria, and the joint exploitation of mineral 
resources in northwest Africa.153 
While a great deal has been written about Moroccan and other regional 
motivations and actors in the Western Sahara conflict, some analysts insist that Algeria’s 
domestic factors and the “geopolitics of faith” in North Africa have received too little 
attention. Algerian elements such as organized crime and state corruption benefit from 
instability, these writers claim, and Algeria exploits the conflict to serve domestic 
political interests, using the POLISARIO Front, for instance, as a puppet in the struggle 
among the DRS, army, and president. Some also link the persistence of the conflict with 
the increasing presence of the religious right organizations in the world’s political space. 
This chapter considers Algeria’s internal power struggle and governmental 
involvement in organized crime as critical factors in the conflict and explores the impact 
of Christian right pressure on U.S. foreign policy, the development of international public 
policy, and human-rights campaigns. 
A. BACKGROUND 
To understand Algerian foreign policy, it is important to recognize the complexity 
of the regime. While no one has a holistic picture of who is really in charge in Algiers, it 
is clear that Algeria’s constitutional organizations are powerless. Since independence, the 
Algerian government has endured a silent struggle among three powerful forces: the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), the department of intelligence and security (DRS), and 
the military. 
After the 1999 election, the Algerian presidency joined this trio to become the 
fourth major actor in domestic politics. Algerian decision makers belong to a select group 
of military elites, called le pouvoir (the power), that “holds the power behind the formal 
arrangements of government.”154 The rules of engagement are simple: maximize control 
and weaken the adversary, by all means necessary. 
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The FLN and the military have been allied since before Algeria’s independence; 
from the French colonial era to the present, the FLN has served as the military’s political 
wing. The FLN was born in Arab nationalist ideas, emphasizing Arabic language and 
culture and marginalizing the Algerian Amazigh identity. Since 1962, the army and FLN 
have excluded any Amazigh from high office in the party and military. The DRS, by 
contrast, was molded in a period when pan-Arabic ideology was secondary (post-1965 
and the Sand War), and Amazighs have traditionally controlled its influential posts. The 
Berber identity has dominated the DRS since inception, and the DRS has thrived by 
exploiting the Arab–Berber divide, sponsoring and retaining support from Berbers in key 
positions.   
B. ALGERIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS 
Algeria’s complex and irregular politics have had a tremendous impact on the 
domestic political, social, and economic conditions in Algeria. They have also adversely 
affected geopolitics and security in the North Africa–Sahel region. 
1. The Internal Struggle for Power 
In his book Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa, Jeremy Keenan 
describes the major roles that the DRS and military have played in shaping the 
country.155 The rise of radical Islam invigorated the DRS, which has expanded 
significantly apart from the military. The army’s power was evident in the 1992 coup, 
when it cancelled national elections and pursued and massacred Islamic Party winners. 
To retain power, the military killed thousands of civilians. Dubbed the “dirty war,” this 
violence aroused international sanctions and condemnation.156  
In 1992, the army relinquished power and in 1999 nominated a leader in the FLN, 
Boutaflika, for president. The DRS, which preferred to deal with a civilian, did not 
object. During the 2004 elections, Boutaflika, who was losing party support, struck a deal 
with his rival in the National Rally for Democracy Party (RND), securing the backing of 
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Ahmed Ouyahia, the general secretary of the RND and an Amazigh from Tizi Ouzou, in 
exchange for the post of prime minister.157 
In his second term of office, Boutaflika conspired with Ouyahia, “a longtime 
protégé of the DRS,”158 to contain the Algerian military. His first significant order of 
business was to depose the army chief of staff, General Mohammed Lamari159 and then 
to capitalize, with the DRS, on the army’s lack of fortitude by grooming a successor 
strong enough to prevent their seizure of power.160 The plan worked. President 
Boutaflika and the DRS chief, General Mouhamed Amin Mediène, shared control of the 
government. 
At the end of his second term, Boutaflika persuaded Mediène to support an 
amendment to the constitution that would eliminate presidential term limits. Their 
seemingly unbreakable alliance ended, however, shortly after Boutaflika began a third 
term in 2009. Mediène expected the president to groom a suitable successor; instead, 
Boutaflika started preparing his own younger brother, Said. This blatant nepotism and the 
prospect of an entrenched dynasty moved the outraged DRS to react. Beginning in 2010, 
Mediène conducted several operations to weaken the president, notably ousting pro-
Boutaflika leaders from Sonatrach, the state-owned energy giant, and replacing them with 
Berber DRS-supported executives.161 
2. Organized Crime and Corruption in Government 
The origins of Algerian support for SADR may have been rooted in congenial 
political ideology, fear of Moroccan aggression, and control of natural resources, but the 
present Algerian investment in sheer unrest is enormous. The instability in the Western 
Sahara border and the Sahel is extremely lucrative for the corrupt, wealthy, and powerful 
of the Algerian regime. It would be nigh impossible for the corrupt military government 
                                                 
157 William Zartman, Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2015), 152, https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., 150. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 150–152. 
 51 
to pursue seriously any resolution that came at the expense of the entrenched black-
market economy.  
Keenan’s findings in his research on Mali and Algeria “revealed a complex 
network of family relationships linking many of the senior levels of the regional 
administration in both southern Algeria and Niger with both smuggling and local banditry 
networks.”162 He concludes that these criminal networks are sanctioned by senior 
policymakers in Algiers.163  
Keenan links the rise of corruption to the deterioration of the Algerian economy 
in the early 90s, claiming the racket began in 1993, when the IMF rescued Algeria from 
the brink of bankruptcy. The IMF granted “a debt-rescheduling package generating a 
windfall of some $10 billion per annum.”164 But the intention of the structural-
adjustment program (SAP)—to foster a liberal market economy in Algeria—backfired. 
“The privatization policy created a ‘plunder economy,’”165 intensifying corruption and 
violence. 
Keenan emphasizes the rampant involvement of Algerian military and security 
forces and the DRS in black-market trade,166 observing that their operations touched  
on almost every aspect of commerce in Algeria, ranging from such things 
as arms and drug trafficking at the more extreme end of the spectrum, 
through cigarette and people trafficking, car theft and exportation, to the 
control of food and livestock markets, cement and construction materials, 
container trafficking, and so on.167  
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Keenan ties the 1992 assassination of Algeria president Mohamed Boudiaf to the 
government mafia, suggesting that Boudiaf’s anticorruption reforms threatened members 
of the military who resolved to liquidate him.168  
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy estimates that a fourth of the fuel 
produced in Algeria is sold on the black market.169 The bulk is distributed in Mali and 
Mauritania; some is smuggled into Morocco, despite the closed border. The institute 
study highlights the dependence of Algeria’s domestic economy on illicit activity, in 
addition to the elite’s enormous stake in revenues from contraband.   
The economies of regions along unsecured North African borders, particularly 
Ahnet, on the Algerian–Libyan border, and Tanezrouft, on the Algerian–Malian 
border,170 depend on smuggling, and porous borders have enabled global crime 
organizations to operate with impunity in an interconnected Middle East, North Africa, 
and Europe. The U.S. Department of Defense confirms a spike of illicit activity in these 
areas, involving terrorists such as the notorious Mokhtar Belmokhtar,171 and the 
European tobacco company Altadis has revealed a proliferation of smuggling routes 
through the oases of Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, which are controlled by the POLISARIO 
Front.172 These clandestine activities occur with the consent or complicity of legal 
authorities, in Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria alike. 
3. Algeria’s Creation of Terror 
After 9/11, Algeria and the U.S. formed an unlikely alliance forged from oil, war, 
terror, and strategic interests. Algeria needed weapons, international clout, freedom from 
sanctions, and a brand new image; the Algerian DRS needed instability to justify its 
existence. Meanwhile, the Bush administration needed terrorism to secure oil from 
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Africa. The attacks of 9/11, coupled with terrorist attacks in Europe and Africa, created 
the conditions for an uneasy marriage. 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. shifted its focus to Africa to pursue 
the war on terrorism and other strategic interests.173 The U.S. had faced an energy crisis 
in the late 90s importing over fifty percent of its domestic consumption and needed a 
strategy to ensure its supplies. Within his first thirty days in office, President Bush set up 
the National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) group, chaired by vice-president Dick 
Cheney. In May 2001, the NEPD published its report, which “defined African oil as a 
‘strategic national interest’ and thus a resource that the U.S. might exert military force to 
control.”174 The subsequent horrific attacks on American soil created the foundation for a 
narrative that expanded the U.S. war on terrorism into North Africa and the Sahel.  
Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks in 2001, a synagogue 
bombing in Tunisia in 2002, a suicide attack at a Casablanca hotel in 2003, the abduction 
of 32 tourists in Algeria in 2003, and the Spanish train bombing of 2004. AFRICOM and 
world security organizations linked these events to Al-Qaeda operatives in North Africa 
and the Sahel, providing the rationale for military intervention.175 
During this time, the world considered Algeria a pariah state for its brutal 
oppression during the dirty war. International sanctions crippled the Algerian economy 
and prevented its acquisition of modern, sophisticated weapon systems,176 but after the 
attacks on U.S. soil, Algeria leveraged gruesome images of the falling towers to justify a 
crackdown on Islamists,177 comparing its actions to the American war on al-Qaeda. The 
Algerian military’s propaganda machine inflated the terrorist threat, hoping to end the 
arms embargo. With a substantial budget and long shopping list, the Algerian president 
made several trips to Washington to argue his need for advanced weapons against the 
terrorist threat in the Sahel. While the state department endorsed the requests on both 
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occasions, Algeria left empty-handed; the White House was not convinced.178 This 
failure added to Algeria’s domestic and regional pressures. 
Algeria found a solution in the Sahel, as KGB-trained operatives of the DRS 
concocted a strategy to create unrest in the Sahel and secure international attention, 
figuring that the right level of instability would allow Algeria to position itself as a 
regional hegemon and antiterrorist ally without inviting the intervention of any Western 
military.179 Keenan asserts that by fomenting terrorism in the Sahel, Algeria could serve 
up a new front in war on terror for the U.S. The DRS’s short-term goal of sponsoring 
AQIM and other terrorist organizations was to deflect attention from the dirty war; the 
long-term strategy was to promote itself as the only regional power capable of engaging 
and containing the new terrorist threats, thereby securing a favorable relationship with the 
West while undermining Morocco and Libya. 
4. Domestic Terrorism  
In an article in States of War Since 9/11: Terrorism, Sovereignty and the War on 
Terror,1 Jeremy Keenan discusses the connection between Algeria’s DRS intelligence 
agency and domestic terrorism. According to Keenan, the DRS created domestic terrorist 
factions to defeat an Islamist movement that was attempting to overthrow the government 
in the early 1990s. He presents new intelligence that points to DRS originations for the 
terrorist group Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), which was to infiltrate other 
radical Islamic networks and defeat them from within.180 Keenan quotes John Schindler, 
a former high-ranking intelligence officer, member of the National Security Council 
(NSC), and a professor of national-security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, as 
stating, 
The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) [of the 1990s and the predecessor of the 
GSPC] was the creation of the DRS; using proven Soviet methods of 
penetration and provocation, the agency assembled it to discredit the 
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extremists. Much of [the] GIA’s leadership consisted of DRS agents, who 
drove the group into the dead end of mass murder, a ruthless tactic that 
thoroughly discredited GIA Islamists among nearly all Algerians. Most of 
its major operations were the handiwork of the DRS, included in 1995 
wave of bombings in France. Some of the most notorious massacres of 
civilians were perpetrated by military special units masquerading as 
mujahidin, or by GIA squads under DRS control.181 
5. DRS Manipulation of the POLISARIO 
From the start, Algeria and Morocco capitalized on their domestic and regional 
problems to strengthen their narratives and advance their agendas. Once the global war 
on terrorism kicked off, it was no surprise that both regimes exploited the hunt for al-
Qaeda to their benefit. Algeria saw an opportunity to exit its international isolation, while 
Morocco aimed to bolster its international support in Western Sahara, and both spoke 
against each other’s actions. Nevertheless, Morocco’s accusations linking Algeria and the 
POLISARIO to terrorist groups were founded in evidence that showed the participation 
of some members of the Tindouf POLISARIO as having participated in AQIM and 
MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) operations, in addition to 
involvement in the drugs and weapons trade in the Sahel. The question arises whether the 
Algerian regime was sponsoring the instability or, rather, losing its grip on the security 
situation. 
International security services have long suspected Algerian military and DRS 
involvement in hostage taking and drug trafficking. However, Rabat’s claims connecting 
the DRS to AQIM received no traction until certain events that unfolded in the Sahel and 
North Africa. One event happened in December 2010, when  
six members of the POLISARIO were arrested in Mali in connection with 
cocaine trafficking. The key drug trafficker arrested was a certain Sultan 
Ould Badi. Ould Badi was not a bit-part player: he was reportedly the head 
of POLISARIO’s “special missions” and believed to have also been 
involved in AQIM kidnappings. On capture, he was threatening the 
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authorities in Bamako that he would reveal the AQIM–DRS 
connection.182  
On learning of Ould Badi’s arrest, President Boutaflika, on official visit in 
Germany, went into damage control, immediately deploying General Rachid Laalali, 
head of the DRS, on a chartered plane to Bamako, where he secured Sultan Ould Badi’s 
release on 9 December 2010.183 Since then, news sources, books, and intelligence reports 
have repeatedly demonstrated connections among POLISARIO camps in Algeria, 
international organized crime, trafficking, and terrorism.  
The crimes and violence of the Sahel used to take a back seat to international 
security concerns. Recently, however, decision makers in the EU and the U.S. have 
placed the instability of North Africa and Sahel at the center in their foreign-security 
policy. The Center for Naval Analysis Strategic Studies (CNA) warned in December 
2012, for example, that “there is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee 
camps in Tindouf, as well as indications that Sahrawi from these camps have jointed 
terrorist groups based in Mali.”184 A regional threat assessment published by the Inter-
University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) in February 2013 concludes that AQIM 
“provided training, financial assistance, and weapons to its affiliates and had attracted an 
influx of recruits from the region including militants from the POLISARIO camps in 
Algeria, displaced refugees, and radicals from Western countries.”185 
International lawmakers have also publically confirmed the collusion of the 
POLISARIO Front with AQIM and MUJAO. For instance, “In February 2013, the 
Malian foreign minister confirmed the presence of Sahrawi combatants from the Tindouf 
camps among the groups that fled the French -led intervention, which was launched to 
counter an advance of insurgents from northern Mali toward the capital.”186 The 
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GlobalPost and Agence France Press (AFP) confirmed this report, revealing that French 
and African forces decimated Mali’s Al Qaeda-linked Islamist insurgency, forcing 
dozens to reorganize in the POLISARIO Front camps in Algeria.187   
In sum, organized crime in the Sahel and North Africa operates with the 
permission or cooperation of the DRS and is connected to terrorist groups in the Sahel 
that are supported by the POLISARIO Front. One may freely deduce that the DRS, 
organized crime, POLISARIO Front, and terrorist groups partner in a way or another, and 
it is reasonable to expect the DRS to enlist any or all of its partners to advance its quest 
for power—in fact, it is widely reported that the AQIM kidnapping of three Western aid 
workers from POLISARIO-run camps in October 2011 was DRS work for this purpose. 
Keenan’s analysis in The Dying Sahara and The Dark Sahara concludes that these 
abductions stemmed from Algeria’s internal competition for power—he believes the DRS 
orchestrated these high-profile crimes to discredit and undermine Boutaflika during the 
presidential elections.188  
6. The Religious Right and the Christian Lobby 
Like Morocco, Algeria retains lobbyists in Washington. According to public 
information relating to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), from 2007–2013, 
Algeria spent $2.4 million lobbying for the POLISARIO Front, compared with 
Morocco’s $20 million on behalf of its territorial integrity.189Though it spends perhaps a 
tenth as much, Algeria benefits from the ancillary lobbying of some Christian interest 
groups who seek to shape domestic and international public policy in accordance with 
Christian missions and values. In Algeria, these interest groups promote freedom of 
religion in the Kabyle region and the liberation of the Saharawi in the Tindouf camps. 
Through their support of these minority communities, these groups help to create a 
favorable environment for evangelical missions.  
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According to the Emory Law Journal, “religious interest groups collectively 
spend over $350 million every year attempting to entrench religious values into the law. 
These groups have become the primary mechanism for religious involvement in federal 
politics.”190 The journal also explains that 
These groups are interest groups that are empowered to represent 
particular religious traditions, specific congregations, or both. Powerful 
examples of this form of interest group include Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints’ Office of Public and International Affairs, “whose 
influence and actions are relevant to the mission of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints,” the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious 
Liberty, which is comprised of “15 national, state and regional Baptist 
bodies in the United States and supported by thousands of churches and 
individuals across the country,” and the Mennonite Central Committee, 




In Toward an Evangelical Public Policy: Political Strategies for the Health of the 
Nation, Ronald J. Sider discuss evangelical activism, writing that groups such as the 
National Associations of Evangelicals (NAE) believe that current circumstances, in 
which affluent evangelical Christians are responding directly to post-9/11 world 
terrorism, provide a historic opportunity to shape domestic and international policy.192 
The author adds that religious institutions are generally exempt from many of the 
disclosure regulations imposed on other organizations, allowing them to finance their 
political ventures away from public scrutiny.193 These exemptions, based on the first-
amendment rights of churches and religious groups, make it nearly impossible to 
determine the identity of targeted lawmakers and total monies contributed to specific 
causes. However, the Pew Research Center reports that nearly two-thirds of religious 
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organizations operating in Washington seek to influence both international as well as 
domestic policies.194  
Algeria privileges access to Tindouf to those organizations that share the 
POLISARIO’s separatist ideology, though certain UN activities are not allowed in the 
refugee camps. For 40 years, Algeria and the SADR have barred the UN High 
Commission on Refugees (HCR) from conducting a census of the Sahrawi population in 
Tindouf, wary of the larger repercussions; by contrast, they have invited religion-based 
NGOs to provide humanitarian, cultural, and educational services in Tindouf (while 
prohibiting such missionary activity in the Kabyle region).195 It is reasonable to assume 
that Algeria exploits humanitarian and religious activism both to derive practical aid and 
to encourage favorable Christian influence in Washington.  
Since September 11, the concept of “good religion/bad religion” has gained 
traction in international public-policy circles,196 by which it is agreed that beneficial 
“religion should be restored to international affairs, while bad religion should be 
reformed or eradicated.”197 This approach considers religion in formulating foreign 
policy, developing public policy, and orienting human-rights campaigns.198  
In her book, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion, 
Elizabeth Hurd demonstrates that the POLISARIO has aligned itself and benefits from 
the support of global religious interest groups to make a comeback in international 
affairs.199 Both Sahrawi and non-Sahrawi actors have used faith and religion to persuade 
international audiences to provide humanitarian and political support for the Sahrawi 
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cause. With Algeria’s support, the POLISARIO has succeeded in mobilizing evangelical 
activists as effective lobbyists for political their separatist cause, both in Europe and the 
U.S.200 
Hurd cites the congressional testimony of Congressman Teresa K. E. Smith de 
Cherif, who defended the POLISARIO against Morocco’s allegation that it was involved 
with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and notes that Smith de Cherif promoted a 
tolerant image of the Sahrawi people in Tindouf, while implying an Islamist, anti-
Christian attitude in Morocco—framing the struggle as between oppressed, poor African 
refugees who are open to Christian teaching versus a harsh Islamic country that 
persecutes Christians. Hurd believes this clash of ideas serves the global vision of 
religious activists. She Hurd wrote that 
Remarkably, so tolerant is (POLISARIO) Saharawi Islam that within the 
last few years, Christian evangelists have held roundtable discussions with 
Saharawi and Algerian religious clerics in the Tindouf camps and have 
built a school for English language studies in the Smara camp. Meanwhile, 
Morocco expels a Spanish citizen from El-Ayoun, where she was teaching 
Spanish, without grounds, but because she is an evangelist Christian.201  
 The Journal of Refugee Studies confirms that high-profile interest groups such as 
Faith and Action in Washington have lobbied in favor of the POLISARIO to promote 
freedom and religious liberty. These groups represent evangelical activists such as Dan 
Stanley of Rock Fish Church and Cheryl Banda and Janet Lenz of Christ the Rock 
Church in Wisconsin, who lobbied the UN general assembly and the decolonization 
committee to increase their efforts to liberate Western Sahara. These groups funded the 
construction of a language school in Tindouf and delivery of humanitarian aid. They also 
organize regular missions trips for church volunteers and congressional visits.202 
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The religious-interest lobby has seen success in shaping some important U.S. 
policies in Morocco. In Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 
Stephen Zunes claims that the 
POLISARIO’s supporters in the U.S. Congress made sure later that 
Western Sahara was specifically exempt from provisions of a free-trade 
agreement with Morocco. As U.S. trade representative (and future World 
Bank president) Robert Zoellick was forced to emphasize, “The United 
States and many other countries do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty 
over Western Sahara” (quoted in Mundy 2005). By then, 2004, Total had 
dropped out of Western Sahara ostensibly for business reasons. Isolated, 
Kerr-McGee came under increasing pressure, even in its home state of 
Oklahoma; Christian activists who had built up humanitarian relations 
with the Sahrawi refugees helped put pressure on the company and on the 
state’s political leaders. Kerr-McGee finally withdrew in 2006.203 
C. THE POWER OF WEAK NEIGHBORS 
It must be observed that the fragile, crisis-ridden countries of the Sahel also 
contribute to the intolerable pressure on the people of Tindouf, who are liable to succumb 
to radicalization and illicit activities. As instability in the Sahel aggravates desperate 
living conditions, individuals may resort to desperate measures. 
All the countries of the Sahel—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, 
Niger, Nigeria, both Sudans, Chad, and Eritrea—are weak and corrupt, despite the 
potential offered by their rich natural resources, and only a small elite has power and 
wealth. These natural resources draw international interest and fuel racial, linguistic, 
cultural, and religious divides as groups compete for opportunity. On the political front, 
minority factions are emboldened to clash with weak governments and push for separate 
identity and governance. 
The Amazighs of the Kayle in Algeria, for example, want to create a separate 
state in which to reap the benefits of their natural resources, which are presently 
controlled and exploited by Algeria. The Touareg of Mali clash regularly with security 
forces over water and arable land, and the Touareg of Libya, many of whom served in 
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Qaddafi's private militia, are sitting on a trove of sophisticate weaponry and training 
brought home from Libya.204 
 In addition to the general distress, the civil wars raging in failed states along the 
southern border of the Sahel, notably the Central African Republic and Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, have brought spikes in crime, violence and chaos. 
The continuing crisis allows ideologies, weapons, drugs, counterfeit goods, and 
combatants to fan out across borders, creating an environment in which terrorist activities 
may be conducted with impunity. International terrorist organizations, which depend on 
organized crime to fund their operations, use the mayhem to connect with regional 
groups, such as AQIM, Boko Haram (in Nigeria), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad 
in West Africa, to raise revenue, recruit fighters and expand their footprint.205 
D. CONCLUSION 
Research has shown that in addition to the widely accepted opinion that the 
conflict in Western Sahara is a product of Algerian–Moroccan rivalry, other factors are 
also in play, such as domestic Algerian politics, U.S. geopolitical interests, and lobbying 
by religious organizations. 
Factions within the Algerian government compete for power and use various 
strategies to expand their influence, including alliances within the pouvoir and the 
leveraging of economic, political, and, often, racial ties. In addition, the DRS is alleged to 
have created and fanned unrest to further Algerian interests. 
Analyzing the impact of corruption on domestic politics and the economy, this 
study concludes that the crime and misbehavior of government officials has been 
exacerbated by the economic crisis and institutional malfeasance, which created a black-
market-dependent economy benefiting the elite, and that personal financial incentives 
have encouraged the regime to support a “manageable” level of instability. Further, this 
research notes allegations that the DRS has cooperated with criminal groups and 
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manufactured terrorism in order to oppose it, thus demonstrating its legitimacy and good 
will to the West. 
Algeria’s interest in the Western Sahara conflict has evolved since its inception. 
In today’s world, instability in the Western Sahara is good for business—unrest keeps the 
borders porous. The consequence of this tolerance is a proliferation of major criminal 
activities that generate billions of dollars for decision makers who will not hesitate to use 
the POLISARIO Front to undermine their rivals and advance their economic interests. 
The chapter concludes by considering the influence of Christian lobbying and weak 
neighboring states as having a substantial impact in the POLISARIO Front conflict.  
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The Western Sahara conflict is one of the most protracted contests the modern 
world has seen. Regional and foreign actors aligned in armed conflict involving Morocco 
and the POLISARIO Front in 1975, and clashes continued till the UN-brokered peace 
deal in 1991, followed by MINURSO deployment in 1992. The ceasefire did not end the 
conflict, however—and for nearly forty years, the UN has been unable to wrap it up. 
This research examines four commonly posited reasons for this failure: Algerian 
aggression; foreign interference; UN inaction; and a combination of factors. It is found 
that while myriad forces are in play, UN inaction is the most fatal—because the UN is the 
one entity entrusted and equipped to act impartially and competently to build peace. The 
UN’s lack of performance is principally due to five difficulties: 
1. An archaic structure unequal to the task of resolving modern conflicts and 
terrorism  
2. Systemic disorganization and lack of oversight 
3. An inability to attract and retain qualified civilian staff in a hazardous 
environment  
4. A built-in bias toward Western allies due to the selection criteria for 
military contingents (including language requirements)  
5. Limited operational capability, especially vis-à-vis intelligence and 
policing  
UN incompetency in staffing and intelligence alone are sufficient to sabotage the 
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict and have made anything but chronic failure 
impossible. Nevertheless, the UN is but first among a host of factors implicated in the 
Western Sahara conflict, which in combination have made its conclusion extremely 
challenging. These include: 
1. The advent of separatist movements in Western Sahara in reaction to 
Spanish and Moroccan domination. 
2. The social, political, and economic disorientation generated by the 
evolving phases of the conflict. 
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3. Moroccan obstructionism, particularly in  
• Invoking the ICJ to prevent Spain from conducting a referendum 
on self-determination  
• Orchestrating the Green March 
• Rejecting the validity of the 1974 census  
• Lobbying of UN members with power of veto. 
4. The pursuit by France and America of special interests and separate 
regional alliances. 
5. Algerian political and social maladies, including 
• Intense suspicion of Morocco 
• Internal power struggles and corruption at all levels 
• Support through the POLISARIO to AQIM and international 
criminal and terrorist groups  
• The fostering of external and internal Islamist groups  
• Encouragement of government failure and grievance in the Sahel 
• Exploitation of political naive religious groups with congressional 
contacts. 
To this analysis presented in this research, the author adds his personal 
assessment, based on close professional observation: namely, that as currently conducted, 
the Western Sahara conflict is both self-perpetuating and irresolvable. While a clean slate 
is never possible, a clean house may be: systemic reforms in the UN are more likely to 
become a priority as the world apprehends the increasing scope and gravity of the 
conflict. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The UN deficiencies identified in this research go beyond its non-performance in 
Western Sahara. MINURSO’s inability to resolve the stalemate is a symptom of radical 
problems within the parent organization. Policymakers are advised to bear in mind 
several key points. 
First, the operational and structural deficiencies of the UN are entrenched and 
systemic. Policymakers should take a hard look at what the future role of the UN might 
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be in the face of unconventional, ever-evolving threats, given that conventional threats 
have historically strained UN capabilities. An unreformed UN is not equipped to serve 
the common wellbeing of our interconnected world. 
Second, the UN veto power, a privilege is wielded by only five members, should 
be reevaluated. A mechanism for strengthening the voice of emerging powers and weaker 
states might be considered. Evidence suggests that while exercising its veto power may 
serve a nation’s short-term interests, in the long run this preemption may cause 
substantial loss for all members by undermining the UN’s egalitarian mythos, morale, and 
effectiveness.  
Third, the status quo in Western Sahara cannot be viewed as sustainable. The 
POLISARIO Front, Algeria, Morocco, and the Sahel have all invested more than they can 
reasonably spare in pursuit of their perceived self-interests.  
• For the POLISARIO Front, poverty and despair among the refugees has 
created radicalization and international crime that exploits the porous 
borders and weakness of the Sahel governments.  
• In Algeria, another wave of unrest after the Arab Spring would be 
crippling. Algeria’s government continues to deteriorate, along with its 
ailing president, Boutaflika. The corruption, radicalization, and poverty 
that have accompanied the Western Sahara conflict have created havoc in 
Algeria. The economy is floundering with the fall of oil prices—Algeria’s 
currency reserves, once among the largest in the world, are now almost 
depleted.  
• Morocco appears to be a rare example of real reform and stability in the 
region and Arab world. Morocco a major economic partner with the EU 
and facilitates the market in Africa; it is one of a handful of U.S. non-
NATO allies and a serious, proven partner against terrorism. But its brand 
of democracy is still in its infancy. Unrest in Tindouf could very well 
destabilize the Moroccan regime, with grim repercussions for European 
security. 
• The Sahel hangs by a thread. Destabilization of any of these players would 
be catastrophic. The fallout from another fallen state like Libya would put 
more weapons on the black market, more refugees in camps, and 
inevitably, more frequent and grandiose terror attacks in Europe and the 
world. 
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On a human level, immiseration of this magnitude and duration must reach a point 
of despair. With nothing to lose, individuals and people groups can be expected to resort 
to livelihoods, lifestyles, or armed conflict that pose grave risk to regional and 
international security—as well as to their personal long-term prospects for survival. After 
forty years, the UN and global leaders must understand and grapple with the Western 
Sahara conflict or reap bitter consequences worldwide. 
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